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Wendy Seltzer§
Charles Sims||

MR. PERRY-CAMPF:# Welcome back everyone and welcome
to those of you who were not here this morning. My name is
David Perry-Campf. I am the managing editor for the Journal. I
would like to welcome you to the panel on Eldred: Mickey Mice?
Potential Ramifications of Eldred v. Ashcroft.
The moderator of the panel will be Hugh Hansen. Professor
Hansen has been at the Law School since 1978 and teaches various
areas of intellectual property law. Is that right?
PROFESSOR HANSEN: That’s fine.
MR. PERRY-CAMPF: He is one of the reasons why the
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law
Journal (IPLJ) is so successful. I would like to thank him again
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for being here and for moderating the panel. Without further ado,
because he doesn’t want any more ado, Professor Hugh Hansen.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Thank you very much. First, I would
just like to get a view of the audience. How many people are
familiar with the Eldred case and how many are not.1
[After shows of hands.]
So we have quite a few who are not and some that are. Okay.
We will keep that in mind when we are speaking.
For those who are not familiar with Eldred, take a look at a
short piece that I did on the case before it was argued that appeared
in the Preview of Supreme Court Cases.2 The journal was
originally aimed to bring Supreme Court newspaper reporters up to
speed to understand the oral argument and to write about the
decision when it came down.
We certainly have a distinguished panel that is fairly evenly
balanced on the merits.
The catalyst for this lawsuit was an extension of the term of
copyright in 1998, the Copyright Term Extension Act (hereinafter
1

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003). The petitioners, individuals, and
companies who excavate the public domain for works with expired copyright, challenged
the constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 [CTEA], Pub. L. No.
105-298, tit. 1, 112 Stat. 2827–28 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.
(Supp. V 2000)). Id. The law increased the term of copyright by twenty years so that
most works are protected for the life of the author plus seventy years. See 17 U.S.C. §
302(a) (2000). The petitioners claimed the law was unconstitutional under the Copyright
Clause’s “limited Times” restriction and under the First Amendment’s free speech
guarantee. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 775. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, affirming a district
court ruling, found the law constitutional. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001),
aff’d, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard oral
arguments on Oct. 9, 2002. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S.
Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/01-618.pdf. On January 15, 2003, the Court affirmed the lower court rulings
and upheld the law’s constitutionality. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 790. In a 7-2 decision, the
Court stated that the CTEA complied with the Copyright Clause’s “limited Times”
prescription and did not create a perpetual copyright, was a rational exercise of the
legislative power conferred by the Clause, and did not violate the First Amendment. Id. at
781, 782–83, 789–90.
2
Hugh C. Hansen, What Are the Constitutional Limits on Congressional Extensions of
the Term of Copyright Protection?, 2001–02 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CASES 38.
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the “Act”),3 which members of Congress fondly called the Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act. People against term
extension unfailingly also refer to it as such because it reflects their
contempt for both Sonny Bono and the Act.4
The original purpose of this Act was not based upon a
copyright policy view that authors needed life plus seventy years
of protection, the new term under the Act. Rather, it was
responding to the European Union Term of Protection Directive,
which pushed copyright from life plus fifty to life plus seventy.5
The reason for the directive also had nothing to do with copyright
policy. It was based upon the need for free movement of goods
within the Community.
Germany's term of protection for
copyright was life plus seventy, Spain had life plus sixty, and the
rest of the member states had life plus fifty.6 This meant that it
was impossible to circulate some goods completely freely
throughout the European Union because in two countries they
might have been protected by copyright whereas in the others they
were in the public domain. The answer was to increase protection
in all Member States to life plus seventy.7

3

See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
See, e.g., http://eldred.cc/eldredvashcroft.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2003). The
website, which is maintained by CTEA opponents, repeatedly refers to the law as the
“Sonny Bono Act.” Id.
5
Council Directive 93/98/EEC, art. I, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 [hereinafter Directive
93/98], reprinted in PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW,
AND PRACTICE 564 (2001). This directive harmonized the term of copyright among the
member states of the European Union to life plus seventy years. Id.
6
See Fred Koenigsberg & Joan T. Pinaire, Impact of International Copyright
Developments in U.S. Practice, in IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT DEVELOPMENTS
IN U.S. PRACTICE, at 540 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course,
Handbook Series No. G4-3932, 1994) (“Copyright terms had previously varied
throughout the EU. Most member countries had adopted the minimum term required by
the Berne Convention: the life of the author plus 50 years. But others had longer terms:
for example, life plus 60 years (Spain) or life plus 70 years (Germany and, for musical
works, France).”). See generally Justine Antill & Peter Coles, Copyright Duration: The
European Community Adopts “Three Score Years and Ten”, 18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
379 (1996).
7
See Koenigsberg & Pinaire, supra note 6, at 540–41 (“Given the concept of a single
internal economic market, it made no sense—indeed, it was counterproductive—to have
varying terms of copyright in the EU.”).
4
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Of course, the Community had a choice of bringing Germany
and Spain down to life plus fifty. This would have raised
constitutional issues, however. The German Constitutional Court,
their Supreme Court for constitutional issues, had already made
noises that it might find European Union actions that exceeded its
authority under the Treaty not binding in Germany. This risked a
constitutional crisis within the European Union.8 Moreover, there
was the general view that it was wrong to take twenty years off the
term of those copyright owners who had an expectation based upon
law of protection of their works for life plus seventy.9
Differences of opinion among countries about intellectual
property may result from whether a country is a net exporter or net
importer of intellectual property products.10 Countries that are net
exporters of IP products, as you might expect, are pro intellectual
property. Net importing countries, which are concerned with costs
of all imported products, have more reservations.
The
Netherlands, a net importer of IP products, is perhaps the most
vocal of countries in this category.11 The Netherlands and three
8

See the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s [German Federal Constitutional Court]
Maastricht decision, BVerfGE 89, 155 [hereinafter Maastricht], translated in 33 I.L.M.
395 (1994). The decision, which upheld the constitutionality of the Treaty of Maastricht,
was key to Germany’s participation in the future of an integrated Europe. See Steve J.
Boom, The European Union After the Maastricht Decision: Will Germany Be the
“Virginia of Europe?”, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 177, 177 (1995). The decision warned that
“the Federal Constitutional Court will examine whether legal acts of the European
institutions and organs are within or exceed the sovereign powers transferred to them.”
Id. The court added that legal acts of the Union that exceed the competences outlined in
the treaty, as interpreted by the German court, will not be legally binding. Id.
9
See Directive 93/98, supra note 5, recital 9 (“[A] harmonization of the terms of
protection of copyright and related rights cannot have the effect of reducing the
protection currently enjoyed by right holders in the Community.”); Antill & Coles, supra
note 6, at 380 (“[It] was deemed contrary to one of the general principles of Community
law (regard for established rights) to reduce the term of protection already granted to
rights owners in certain Member states.”).
10
See, e.g., J. Thomas McCarthy, Intellectual Property—America’s Overlooked
Export, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 809 (1995); Hamish McRae, The Business World: So,
How Much Did Harry Potter Make for the Rest of Us?, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 7,
2001, at 2 (discussing a recent International Monetary Fund report stating which
countries are the biggest importers and exporters of intellectual property).
11
See Hilary Clarke, EC Governments Agree on New Copyright Accord; Terms May
Mean Protection for 100-Plus Years, HOLLYWOOD REP., Nov. 9, 1993 (“In a strongly
worded statement . . . the Dutch government said the new rules ‘don’t just give
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other net-importing countries were against the Directive.12 It just
passed under the qualified majority voting scheme for directives.13
One reservation about the increase of the term of copyright
was that it would benefit the United States the most.14 About the
only thing that unites the world today is its anti-Americanism. It is
unlikely that the Term Directive would have been adopted if U.S.
works received the benefit of the twenty year term extension.15
So they did what they were allowed to under the Berne
Convention, which was the rule of the shorter term, saying that
unless your country also protects the same amount we protect,
nationals of your country will not received the higher term of
protection.16 I am convinced that the EU was hopeful that the
United States would not adopt life plus seventy years. This is
because the amount of revenue leaving Europe would not be
matched by the amount of term extension revenue leaving the U.S.
for Europe, as there really are not that many European works that

preference to the interests of the author over those of the consumer’ but ‘also complicate
relations with third countries.’”).
12
See Approval for 70-Year Copyright Protection, EUR. REP., Oct. 30, 1993 (“[T]he
Luxembourg, Dutch and Portuguese delegations were opposed [to the resolution] and the
Irish abstained. France, Germany and Italy explained that they had approved the
Directive because it guarantees free movement of copyrighted works while eliminating
distortions of competition, because it will encourage literary and artistic creation and
because it respects national peculiarities in copyright protection.”), available at 1993 WL
2490038.
13
See id.
14
See Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 79 & n.10 (2000) (noting that American industries that are heavily
dependent on copyright habitually report considerable losses to the domestic economy as
a result of copyright infringement abroad and arguing that the increase in international
harmonization of intellectual property rules may promise heightened global enforcement
of rights, which should in theory significantly benefit the United States). This is also true
because American music and movies might predominate in those for whom protection for
life plus 70 would produce monetary reward.
15
See McRae, supra note 10, at 2 (noting that the United States is the largest net
exporter of intellectual property).
16
Directive 93/98, supra note 5, art. 7, § 1. See also Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S.
221 [hereinafter Berne Convention] (establishing a basic term of life of the author plus
fifty years), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/treaties/berne/overview.html.
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would get the advantage of the life plus seventy over here,17 and
there are a lot of American works that would get the advantage
and, therefore, take revenue out of Europe.18
But Congress did pass life plus seventy.19 There were
academics and some user groups in opposition.20 I think Congress
basically saw it as a trade bill creating more jobs, tax revenues, et
cetera. The copyright policy arguments that were presented by
some law professors in opposition to a term extension thus had
little effect and Congress passed it.21
Larry Lessig, a well-known academic, came up with a
constitutional attack on the Act. I thought it was doomed to lose.
Most people in the copyright field thought likewise. He lost in the
district court;22 he lost in the court of appeals.23 I do not know
17

See McRae, supra note 10, at 2 (“America may have an enormous appetite for
foreign goods—German cars, Japanese TVs and so on—but it has no appetite for foreign
intellect.”).
18
See The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearings on S. 483 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 73 (1995) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 483]
(statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (suggesting that the loss of twenty years’ copyright
protection would hurt U.S. trade: “In a world economy where copyrighted works flow
through a fiber optic global information infrastructure, American competitiveness
demands that we adapt our laws—and adapt them quickly—to provide the maximum
advantage for our creators.”).
19
See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
20
See Jenny L. Dixon, The Copyright Term Extension Act: Is Life Plus Seventy Too
Much?, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 945, 973 (1996) (“Opposition to the proposed
extension comes primarily from the academic community.”); Letter from Mary Burgan,
General Secretary of the American Association of University Professors, to
Representative Henry J. Hyde, Chair, House Judiciary Committee (Oct. 8, 1997)
(opposing copyright extension legislation), http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/
OpposingCopyrightExtension/letters/aaup-01.html.
21
See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. S11672 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(“The 1998 Report on Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy issued by the
International Intellectual Property Alliance indicates just how important the U.S.
copyright industries are today to American jobs and the economy and, therefore, how
important it is for the U.S. to give its copyright industries at least the level of protection
that is enjoyed by European Union industries.”); 144 CONG. REC. H9950 (daily ed. Oct.
7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Coble) (“[The bill] will give the United States economy 20
more years of foreign sales revenue from movies, books, records and software products
sold abroad. . . . This bill is also good for consumers. . . . When works are protected by
copyright, they attract investors who can exploit the work for profit. That in turn brings
the work to the consumer . . . .”).
22
See Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003).
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anyone on either side of the debate who thought that certiorari
would be granted.24
When the Court granted certiorari, people were dumbstruck. I
had confidently predicted that certiorari would be denied. People
started thinking of reasons why the Court did grant certiorari. Of
course, Larry Lessig had been a clerk of Scalia.25 I do not know if
that had any effect. It probably did not hurt, but I am sure that
certiorari was not granted just because of that factor. But it was a
puzzlement. Ultimately, the petitioners primarily objected to the
so-called retroactive protection: protection for works already in
existence.26
There are various arguments that can be made against this. The
Preamble to the Copyright Clause states, “To promote the Progress
of Science and the useful Arts”“Science” meaning learning and
“useful Arts” meaning the patent-type inventionsCongress shall
have the power to grant for “limited Times to Authors and
Inventors exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”27 The argument goes that this clause somehow
creates an obligation upon Congress only to enact copyright
provisions whose purpose is to provide incentives for creation of
new works. Protection for existing works, by definition, could not
create incentives for their creation.28 The extension for existing

23

See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003).
24
See Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Review Copyright Extension, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
20, 2002, at C1 (“The court’s action took the world of copyright holders and users by
surprise.”).
25
Lessig clerked for Scalia during the Supreme Court’s 1990–91 term. Stanford Law
School, Lawrence Lessig: Curriculum Vitae, Stanford Center for Internet and Society, at
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/lessig/bio/cv/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
26
See generally Brief for Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No.
01-618) (attacking the retroactive extension of the copyright terms and arguing that the
CTEA’s prospective and retroactive extensions of copyright terms are unseverable),
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/opening-brief.pdf.
27
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
28
See Brief for Petitioners at 40–41, Eldred (No. 01-618) (“[W]indfall benefits for the
economic well-being of authors and their heirs independent of any claimed incentive to
create cannot constitute a legitimate, much less an important or substantial, governmental
interest sufficient to justify a restriction of speech.”).
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works is just a windfall at the expense of the public.29 There is
dispute as to whether that requirement of providing incentives for
creation necessarily flows from the preamble or not.30 Justice
Souter, for instance, in the Supreme Court in oral argument
indicated that it went beyond that; Congress had more discretion
on how to promote science than to just provide incentives for new
creative activity.31
In any case, that argument coupled with a limited times
argument meant that this extension was unconstitutional.32 There
was also a First Amendment angle which was not completely
independent of the other arguments. This argument was not
particularly clear but it seemed to be that copyright is a restriction
of free expression and as such needs First Amendment scrutiny of
some kind. At the least, there should be the time, place, manner
analysis used for content neutral state actions33 The thrust was that
if you applied either the constitutional power analysis based upon
of article 1, section 8, clause 8, or even low level First Amendment
analysis, at least the application of term extension to existing
works
(so-called
retroactive
application)
would
be
unconstitutional.34
29
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech:
Why the Copyright Extension Act Is Unconstitutional, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 83, 95–96
(2002) (“The question is how to balance the moral rights of the producer of expression
with the interests of the general public in the widest possible dissemination of speech.
Copyright law does this when applied prospectively by giving authors and artists notice
as to the protections that they will have. Retroactive extension is a windfall, benefiting
one group—the copyright holders, who may or likely may not be the producers, at the
expense of another group—those who want wider dissemination of the speech.”).
30
See Brief for the Respondent at 44, Eldred (No. 01-618) (arguing that rather than
granting windfall benefits, the CTEA “allows copyright holders an opportunity to profit
from their creative property to the extent that they succeed in making the works publicly
available”), http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/government-brief.
pdf.
31
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6–7, Eldred (No. 01-618).
32
See Brief for Petitioners at 17–23, Eldred (No. 01-618). Specifically, the petitioners
argued that copyright terms under the CTEA were no longer “limited,” did not promote
the progress of science, and were not compatible with the quid pro quo requirement of the
Copyright Clause. The petitioners further argued that history confirms that the law
exceeded Congress’s power. Id. at 23–30.
33
See id. at 34–47.
34
See id. at 17–33 (noting the unconstitutionality of the retroactive provision under
Copyright Clause).
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We are fortunate to have speakers who will cover all sides of the
argument, so that is enough background.
We have among the panelists at least two who are squarely
against the Act and its constitutionality. One may not be for the
Act on policy grounds but certainly thinks it is constitutional.
David Carson is with the Copyright Office and we’ll see what are
his public views. I am the moderator, but
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: But not moderate.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Some people say I am going to
immoderate the panel today, which may be true. But I do have a
position on this.
We will start out with Professor Moglen, who is at Columbia
University. He started out his professional career, after going to
Swarthmore, on the technical side. He was a Programmer/Analyst
in the Programming Language Research and Development
Department of IBM. Then he went to law school at Yale. At the
same time he was going to law school, he was also getting a
Masters and Ph.D. in History. He was with Cravath Swaine &
Moore for a year. Then he clerked for Judge Weinfeld in the
Southern District. He probably did not even see daylight for long
times in the winter as Judge Weinfeld worked his clerks very hard.
He was a wonderful judge, probably the best district court judge in
the country. Then Professor Moglen went to clerk for Thurgood
Marshall. From there he started teaching at Columbia. Eben
teaches an English Legal History course, and the other one is
Internet and Constitutional Law.
Every speaker has twelve minutes, which leaves us plenty of
time for discussion.
Eben, please take it away.
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: Thank you. I am very pleased to be
here. I appreciate very much the invitation from the IPLJ to talk to
you today about this fascinating, but actually rather unimportant,
little case.
I do want to say a couple of things in response to Hugh’s
immoderate introduction, which I very much appreciate as clearing
the ground.
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The reason that we call the statute the Sony Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act is that is what Congress called it,35 and they
called it that because they needed the fact that this moron skied
into a tree as an excuse for the perpetration of a particular crime
against the public interest of the United States.
Hugh is utterly factually incorrect. The statute had nothing
whatsoever to do with term extension in the European Union.
The lawsuit, which began before the statute, was planned first
in conversations that Larry36 and Charlie Nesson37 and I had at
Harvard in 1994. We knew that there would be the statute and we
knew that there would be the lawsuit against the statute at a time
when the European Term Extension Directive had not even issued.
The reason that we knew all that was Mickey Mouse. That is
to say, we knew that, beginning in 2004, expiration of copyrights
would begin. It has nothing to do with individual authors, folks.
Life plus seventy is total nonsense. It has to do with the term of
corporate ownership of copyrights. We knew that the beginning of
the mass media copyright expiration period would begin in 2004.
Steamboat Willie, which is the moment at which the thugs take
over culture in the United States, is 1928.38

35

See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“This title may be referred to as the ‘Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act.’”).
36
Lawrence Lessig represented Eric Eldred in Eldred v. Ashcroft, challenging the 1998
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act. He is currently a Professor of Law at
Stanford Law School. Professor Lessig was the Berkman Professor of Law at Harvard
Law School. He is the author of The Future of Ideas and Codes and Other Laws of
Cyberspace. He teaches and writes in the areas of constitutional law, contracts,
comparative constitutional law, and the law of cyberspace. See http://cyberlaw.standford.
edu/lessig/bio/short/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2003).
37
Charles Nesson is the William F. Weld Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and
co-director of the Berkman Center for Internet & Society. See The Berkman Center for
Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, Charles Nesson Harvard Law School
Biography, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/nesson.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
38
See Disney Archives, Steamboat Willie, at http://disney.go.com/disneyatoz/archives/
movies/steamboat/steamboat.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2003). Steamboat Willie was the
first Mickey Mouse cartoon released, on November 18, 1928. Prior to the passing of the
CTEA, the original drawings of Mickey Mouse in Steamboat Willie would have expired
in 2003. See Pub. L. No. 95-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572–76 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 301–304 (2000)) (extending the term of protection to the life of the author plus
fifty and extending the term of protection for works for hire to seventy-five years).
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And so we knew that there would be special-interest legislation
purchased from a hired Congress to extend indefinitely the
corporate control of American culture, and we knew that it would
be necessary to attack it.
The revolution against intellectual property, which I represent
in my work, thinks ten years ahead, which is why we are already in
the post-Microsoft era, though you are not, and why we are already
worried not about what will happen in Eldred but what will happen
after the end of the recording industry, which, despite the fact that
they are still paying Chuck’s bills, we are certain to bring about
within the next fifteen years.39
Eldred is in that sense a tiny, little sideshow in the fundamental
activity, which is the deliberate and intentional destruction of the
intellectual property system by people who recognize that in the
twenty-first century, when all works of knowledge, learning, art,
culture, music, useful information, and technical understanding
have zero marginal cost, and can be given to everybody in the
world for the same price that the same person receives them, it is
immoral to exclude people from knowledge and from culture.40
The system of private property and ideas is a system that befit
the bourgeois capitalism of the twentieth century.
It is
inappropriate to the conditions of the twenty-first century, as
broadcasting and the private ownership or licensing of spectrum

39

See, e.g., Eben Moglen, Liberation Musicology, NATION, Mar. 12, 2001, at 5
(predicting the end of the recording industry due to OpenNap software that enables every
computer to engage in music sharing without a centralized registry such as Napster);
Eben Moglen, The Public’s Business, LINUXUSER, May 2001, at 66 (predicting that
government contracts based on competitive bidding will go to firms that employ free
software, which will result in a reduced dependence on Microsoft and free software
holding the world’s largest market for computer software), available at http://www.
linuxuser.co.uk/articles/issue10/lu10-Free_Speech-The_publics_business.pdf.
See
generally Eben Moglen, Columbia Law School, at http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu (last
visited Mar. 10, 2003) (containing Eben Moglen’s curriculum vitae, research agenda,
selected publications, and links to related sites).
40
Cf. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 94–95 (2001) (quoting Thomas
Jefferson and explaining why information should be free).
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are inappropriate to the technical conditions of the twenty-first
century.41
A corps of people around the worldtens in the beginning,
now hundreds of thousands, soon to be millionsare engaged in
various collaborative enterprises to destroy that unjust system.
One tiny piece of that activity is the elimination of those pieces of
the copyright system that establish the control of culture on the
parts of organizations utterly uncontrolled by the bought politics of
the United States and the European Union.42
Eldred is a tiny test of the relationship between the principles
of the freedom of speech and the principles of the ownership of
culture and ideas.43 It shocks the copyright lawyers that the
Supreme Court grants certiorari because it shocks the copyright
lawyers that there is the First Amendment at all. It shocked even
Melville Nimmer, who before his death did manage to point out
that the ownership of Blackacre in perpetuity is acceptable where
the ownership of Black Beauty in perpetuity is not, as Nimmer
said, because of the First Amendment.44 What Eldred tests is the
willingness of the Justices of the Supreme Court to recognize that
fact now, at the opening of the twenty-first century.
41

See MARJORIE HEINS, “THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND USEFUL ARTS”: WHY
COPYRIGHT TODAY THREATENS INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM, A PUBLIC POLICY REPORT
(2002), http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/copyright.html.
42
See Brief of Amici Curiae of the Free Software Foundation at 12, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618), http://moglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/eldredamicus.html; Daren Fonda, Copyright Crusade Eric Eldred Says the Latest Copyright
Goes Too Far, BOSTON GLOBE MAG., Aug. 29, 1999, at 12.
43
See Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 769. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the
CTEA under the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause. Id. at 775. Petitioners
argued that Congress’s power under the Copyright Clause is contingent upon an
exchange involving the author’s exclusive right for a limited time and a dedication to the
public thereafter. Id. Petitioners claimed “the CTEA is a content-neutral regulation of
speech that fails inspection under the heightened judicial scrutiny appropriate for such
regulations.” Id.
44
Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guaranties of
Free Speech and the Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1193 (1970) (“Some may question
why literary property should be treated differently from other forms of property? If I
may own Blackacre in perpetuity, why not also Black Beauty? The answer lies in the
[F]irst [A]mendment. There is no countervailing speech interest which must be balanced
against perpetual ownership of tangible real and personal property. There is such a
speech interest with respect to literary property, or copyright.”).
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Now, I will say, in all candor, that in 1994 and thereafter, I was
against bringing this lawsuit now. My own personal preference
was for a negotiated disposition, rather like that of the Sonny Bono
Term Extension Act, that is to say, a comparatively short renewal
of Michael Eisner’s ownership of everything. My reasoning was,
that as the logic of the needs of the widows and orphans (who are
of course the exclusive possessors of Mr. Eisner’s stock) compels
Mr. Eisner to strangle culture yet further by making everything a
pay-per-view/pay-per-read subscription proposition for everybody
on earth, the Congress and the judges will become increasingly
aware of the fatal flaw in the extension of terms, a flaw which,
despite Professor Hansen’s absolute commitment to this immoral
and disgraceful system, he too recognizes and told you about. He
told you that the limitation of terms in existencehad the
European Union, for example, chosen to shorten the term of
subsisting copyrights45would have raised a taking-of-property
problem even in their weak, lukewarm, and ludicrous European
system of constitutional protection, let alone here.
Yet, the brief of the United States Government in Eldred
argues that Congress has plenary power to set the terms of
copyrightssubsisting ones as well as copyrights to be issuedbe
those terms what they may.46 And although the Solicitor General,
himself personally arguing this case, was not asked by the Court
the question, had he been asked whether Congress has the power to
shorten the terms of subsisting copyrights, the logic of his brief
would have required him to say yes.47

45

See Directive 93/98, supra note 5.
Brief for the Respondent at 7, Eldred (No. 01-618).
47
See Brief of Amici Curiae of the Free Software Foundation, Eldred (No. 01-618).
Authored by Moglen, the brief argues that under the logic of the Solicitor General’s
apparent argument, Congress could pass a statute shortening the term of existing
copyrights. Id. at 13. “If the statute simply provided that the term of copyright be
reduced to fourteen years, according to the Court of Appeals, that would satisfy the
requirement of ‘limited Times,’ and there would be no occasion for the Courts to inquire
into whether such a change promoted the progress of science and the useful arts, though
copyright holders could well be expected to contend that such an alteration of the
duration of existing copyrights deprived them of the benefit that the ‘copyright bargain’
supposedly ‘secures’ them.” Id.
46
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Of course, had Congress chosen not to lengthen the term of
copyright but to shorten it, they would have faced immediately,
from Chuck and all the other hirelings of the thugs in Hollywood,
an avalanche of arguments concerning takings of property rights,
as Professor Hansen acknowledges.
It is the fact that the public domain, the reversionary interest of
copyrights, the constitutional limitation on the terms, can no more
be adjusted without a taking of the rights of people than the term
itself.48 In precisely the same way that the Supreme Court
recognizes that you may take the interest of the reversioner of a
lease in order to give the fee simple to the property owner as a
matter of land reform only if you compensate.49 Facing squarely
the question now presented, in all justice the Supreme Court would
be compelled to agree that you cannot take the reversioner’s
interest in the public domain without payment.50
It is this fundamental unfairness of the legislation, which ought
to vitiate the arguments by the copyright theorists who would
themselves be agitated by a shortening of subsisting terms. They
ought to be on our side. But, unfortunately, the bread of the
copyright lawyers has always been buttered by the copyright
industries, and remains so now.
So what we have, in other words, is a purchased Congress, a
piece of corrupt hireling legislation, a bought bar, and a co-opted
academic circle of commentators, but also a vivid and unstoppable
ongoing revolution.
Now, they will tell you, I suppose, that Eldred is a lost case for
my dear friend Professor Lessig, who is today in Japan, else I am
sure he would want to be here. They will predict, I have no doubt,
some number of votes amounting as close to nine as they can
fantasize, though on the transcript of the argument they will have
48

See id. at 5, 9.
See Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). In Midkiff, the Court
upheld a land distribution scheme implemented by the Hawaiian legislature. The Court
stated that the state could take property as long as it was for a public purpose even if the
property ended up in private ownership. That the government compensated landowners
for the taking was dispositive on the issue of constitutionality even though the adequacy
of compensation was not addressed by the Court. Id.
50
See Brief of Amici Curiae Free Software Foundation at 11, Eldred (No. 01-618).
49
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some difficulty counting past seven, no matter what they do. And
they will conveniently ignore for you that it takes four votes to
grant certiorari in the Supreme Court and not a single one of those
votes was a vote to affirm. For the very reason that Professor
Hansen himself suggested, everybody who thought they knew the
answer in the case was for leaving it alone. We had four votes,
folks, on the morning of the argument. On the Friday morning
thereafter, when the case was decided, it is my belief that we had
six. If we have not even five, tant pis [pity], the revolution goes
on.
The end of the movie industry is twenty-five years off, no
matter what, thanks to the sharing of video by everybody on planet
Earth who wants to share it. The end of the recording industry is
ten years off for the same reason, and a good thing too. The end of
the software monopoly has already happened; you just do not
know it yet.
So from my point of view, Eldred represents a minor test of the
willingness of the existing regime to modernize, to become the
ancien regime peacefully, slowly, gradually, more in an English
way than in a French one.
But we do not care. Our goal is justice. We will take it either
way. Freedom now.
Thank you very much.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I am just wondering when will we
get to the argument on the merits. Assuming that someone does
not share your hatred for capitalism, corporations, the middle class,
and everything that this country stands for, is there anything else
that might support your position? It was very interesting, though.
A sort of “Das Disney.” It is a good thing they don’t have
guillotines anymore, because Eisner would be in trouble, wouldn’t
he?
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: He’s in trouble already, is he not?
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Maybe you will just improvise.
Our next speaker is Charles Sims. What do you think of
Chuck? The person on your left?
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: Were you asking me?

5 - PANEL II FORMAT

5/30/03 7:56 AM

786

[Vol. 13:771

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

PROFESSOR HANSEN: Yes.
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: I think he is a superb lawyer. He
beat my brains out in the Second Circuit in the DVD cases, for
reasons that still mystify me.51
PROFESSOR HANSEN: All right.
Chuck went to Amherst, then Yale, then clerked in the District
Court of Rhode Island, and then for eight or ten years was with the
ACLU, First Amendment practice, where he supervised Supreme
Court practice and argued in the Supreme Court, Second Circuit,
and other courts. Now he is at Proskauer Rose LLP, where he is
litigating copyright, First Amendment and defamation cases. Most
of Chuck’s clients in copyright litigation, I think, have been
copyright owners, but I am not sure.
MR. SIMS: And against Eben and his friends.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: So welcome Chuck. You have
twelve minutes.
MR. SIMS: Eben spoke spectacularly. I had the pleasure of
going to college in the late 1960s and early 1970s, I got out in
1971, and that was like being in an old Students for Democratic
Society (SDS) meeting. That was just great.
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: He admits to being there, you notice.
MR. SIMS: And I know what side I was on, too.
As I have watched the copyright wars over the last few years,
one of the things that I have remarked to people, and I have never
gotten confirmation such as this, is that the spirit on the other side
is very much the spirit of the late 1960s. It is very much the spirit
of bring down the corporation, let it all fall down. Eben has in
great prose given us the locus classicus, I guess, of that position.
Eldred was not an unimportant, little case until the day of its
argument. This was the case that Larry Lessig and Yochai
Benkler, and I dare say Eben, although I didn’t hear him talk about
it, thought was the single most important copyright case of a
generation. I think it is being repositioned as unimportant because,
in fact, it will be lost, and it should be lost.
51

See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
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The arguments that were made here, the arguments that were
made in the Supreme Court in the briefs by the petitioners and by
their allies, are precisely the same arguments that were made to
Congress.52 I do think it is fair to say that the law was passed a
year or two early for them, in the sense that I think that there has
gotten to be a movement of users, led by a group of
academicscopyright professors they style themselves, although I
think of them as the anti-copyright professors. There is no other
area of the academic professoriate that I am aware of, no other
area, in which there is all of this passion on one side and very few
people on the other. Aside from the deans of the old copyright law
professors, Bob Gorman, Paul Goldstein, and Jane Ginsberg, there
is this group of forty-two of them or so who testified in Congress,53
who filed briefs in case after case. They have lost most of them.
They feel very passionately, as Eben has just indicated to you.
The question in this case is a constitutional question, or two
constitutional questions.54 It is not whether the law was a good
idea or not.
It is whether Congress had the power to enact the law.55 As to
that question, which Eben did not talk about very much, I think the
answer can only be what the two lower courts held and what the
Supreme Court, I dare say, will hold, which is that whether or not
this is as good law. Whether or not the Washington Post or the
New York Times56 have editorialized against it on policy grounds,
the fact is that Congress had the power because the framers of the
Constitution gave Congress the power to secure copyright for

52

See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003).
53
See Hearings on S. 483, supra note 18.
54
Brief for Respondent at I, Eldred, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618).
55
See Brief for the Petitioners at 28, Eldred, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618).
56
See, e.g., Copyrights and Wrongs, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2002, at A24 (“There is no
question that the plaintiffs in the current litigation—a group of publishers and individuals
who deal in public domain materials—have a righteous gripe against Congress’s move in
1998 to offer an additional 20 years of protection.”); The Supreme Court Docket; The
Coming of Copyright Perpetuity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2003, at A28 (“This decision
almost certainly prepares the way for more bad copyright extension laws in the future.”).
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limited times, and in the case of corporations, ninety-five years is
clearly a limited time.57
Now, one of the most amazing things about this
argumentand I think the moment at which it was securely lost
was when the petitioners gave up on the proposition of trying to
argue to the Court that ninety-five years was too long, or life plus
seventy was too long. They did not really make that argument.
They, in fact, conceded that for prospective works it was not too
long.58 It is impossible analytically to figure out how a period of
time that is limited for works written in the future can violate the
requirement that it be a limited time for other works. There is no
principled basis on which to bring a lawsuit complaining about the
works from the 1920s and 1930s that are not going to get into the
public domain for another twenty years and to not worry about
what is going to happen eighty or ninety or 120, whatever it is,
years from now about the last twenty years when nothing will go
into public domain because of this law.
So, having abandoned the proposition that it was possible to
argue that this time is not limited, which is really the only issue
that the Constitution and the enabling clause59 presents, they made
a very curious argument. Their argument was essentially this: It is
very difficult to tell you, Supreme Court, what is too long. We are
not prepared to tell you that ninety-five years is too long. But we
think you should make a structural gambit instead. If you simply
hold, as a matter of policy really, that Congress does not have the
power to extend the term for works already written, then the
problem solves itself. Then there will not be the enormous
pressure from the Walt Disney companies of the world to do what
is done, and Congress, without these pressures from existing
copyright owners, will be able to do its job and function as an ideal
legislature of Thomas Jefferson and come to a just result.60

57
58
59
60

See Eldred, 239 F.3d at 380.
See Brief for the Petitioners at 48–49, Eldred (No. 01-618).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See Brief for the Petitioners at 11, Eldred (No. 01-618).
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It is a curious argument. It sounds like a political science
professor’s argument. It sounds like a Yale Law School argument.
It does not sound like a legal argument.
I think that by the time Larry was up arguing the case, the
whole enterprise had the smell of the lamp about it. It seemed like
a clever idea that a bunch of very smart people had concocted and
they had ridden this horse as far as it would go, and by the end of
the day it just didn’t really stand up to analysis.
The historical claims that were made were proven, I think, by
the briefs, entirely false.61 The fact is that extending copyright
term for existing works is not something that Michael Eisner
cooked up. It is not something that paid shills for the movie
industry concocted. The very first Congress did it in 1790,62 and it
had been done in 1831,63 in 1909,64 and in the consolidated period
of time from the 1960s to 1976 in which Congress decided
essentially to extend copyright to life plus fifty.65 So, with an
unbroken history from 1790 forward, and with enormous reliance
inferences, Justice Breyer pointed out, since 1976 there have been
enormous numbers of peoplecreators, companies, creative
companies, companies in the content businesseswho have relied
on the extensions from 1976, bought and sold companies, bought
and sold catalogues.66
The arguments made in this case have equal application to
what happened in 1976. If the 1998 law was struck down, so too
would have to be the 1976 law, with staggering consequences that
it is hard to imagine the Court contemplating.67
61

See id. at 23–27; Brief for the Respondent at 11–18, Eldred (No. 01-618).
Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802).
63
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 2, 4 Stat. 436.
64
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080.
65
Pub. L. No. 95-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572–76 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§
301–304 (2000)).
66
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Eldred (No. 01-618).
67
See Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Publishers et al. at 25–31,
Eldred (No. 01-618) (“Petitioners’ theory would unsettle, for tens of thousands of
copyright owners, rights established by the 1976 Act and the extensions leading up to it.
Countless transactions would risk being undone, and countless investment-backed
expectations denied.”), http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/oppamici/aap.pdf.
62
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Lessig answered that sometimes when future consequences
look really bleak, you play a little with retroactivity and just have a
constructive decision going on.68 Nobody on the Court, I thought,
seemed persuaded by that. A few of the people on the Court really
made mock of it, pointing out that in the First Amendment area, for
example, the Court had never either been presented with, much
less adopted, any kind of argument like that, and it would be
antithetical to most of the Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence.69
I think, as I say, the question really is not whether the law is a
good idea or not. I am not sure I would have voted for the law.
But I do think that we have a legislature. There is good reason for
Congress to be making these decisions. It can consider widely all
sorts of considerations.
One of the considerations it had in mind, and which I think it is
plain the European Community had in mind too, is that, although it
seems like a long time, from the point of view of the functional
purpose of copyright, which is to enable authors, creators, men and
women, to care for their spouses and children, the whole next
generation, the amount of time involved is now really equivalent to
what it used to be.70 That is, people are living longer. There was
testimonythis is not just Michael Eisner going up on the Hill and
testifying. Quincy Jones testified.71 There were comments about
Saul Bellow and various other creators who had children very late
in life, and copyright has for more than a hundred years, I think,
aimed to take care of their children for the whole balance of their
lives as part of the incentivizing mechanisms that we have.72
So the notion that it was an aim of the people who brought this
lawsuit to bring down the motion picture industry, I think that is
worth really thinking about. There are motion pictures of great

68

See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Eldred (No. 01-618).
See id. at 13, 16–18.
70
See S. REP. 104-315, at 10–11 (1996), available at ftp://ftp.loc.gov/pub/thomas/
cp104/sr315.txt.
71
See Hearings on S. 483, supra note 18.
72
See S. REP. 104-315, at 10–11.
69
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power made all over the world. I happen to be a Satyajit Ray73
aficionado. I watch his Indian movies a lot. He, like most
filmmakers, needs money to make films and needs copyright
protection in order to do it. The whole financing of motion
pictures, whether they are meretricious movies by people who do
one set of things, or wonderful art movies that others of us might
preferbut the whole enterprise is really based on foreseeable
revenues that come from at its base copyright law.74 The notion
that a bunch of law school professors can blithely decide that this
is a bad system, so let’s tear this down is not, I think, an attractive
picture and I do not think it is going to be successful.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Thank you.
Wendy Seltzer went to Harvard College and Harvard Law
School. She is a Fellow with the Berkman Center for Internet &
Society at Harvard Law School, a research center devoted to the
active study of law in cyberspace, where she leads the Openlaw
project’s public discussion of Eldred and has assisted with the case
since its inception. She practiced litigation in intellectual property
law as an associate with Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP,
and she teaches Internet Law as an Adjunct Professor at St. John’s
University School of Law.
Wendy.
MS. SELTZER: I have been working on this case since its
beginnings, leading the Berkman Center’s Openlaw forum for
public discussion of the case.75 The time that its importance really
came home to me was going down to Washington on the morning
of October 9, 2002 and seeing a crowd lined up around the block
outside the Supreme Court, many of whom had arrived there the
night before, in order to hear a copyright case.76 These were
members of the public lining up to hear lawyers arguing about
copyright, in challenge to enact the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
73

Satyajit Ray is an Indian filmmaker. See http://www.satyajitray.org (last visited Apr.
6, 2003).
74
See Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Publishers et al. at 25, Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618).
75
See http://eldred.openlaw.org.
76
See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Hear Arguments in Challenge to Copyrights, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2002, at C1.
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Extension Act, that had passed on a voice vote and unanimous
consent in the Congress, without a single vote of opposition.
So what I see as an immediate ramification of the Eldred case
is that that will not happen again. Now we have a public watching
what is happening in the copyright arena, the public concerned
about the expansion of copyright and the trend toward copyright as
property and as control, and a public that will be fighting these
battles beyond Eldred. Because Eldred is not just a fight about
twenty years of copyright or about reclaiming Mickey Mouse for
the public domain, but a fight to restore balance to the copyright
law—the balance that the Constitution prescribes.
The Copyright Clause tells us that Congress has the power to
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”77 So to promote progress,
the publication and dissemination of new works, Congress can
grant limited monopolies in those works, and the clause is both the
grant and the limitation on that congressional power.78 And the
First Amendment constrains the exercise of congressional power
because, after all, copyright is a restriction on speech.79
The petitioners in Eldred argued that Congress has forgotten
that balance, that Congress has abandoned the public side to the
copyright grant by continually reaching into the past and extending
the terms of copyrights long after they have promoted whatever
creation they were going to promote—at the time the work was
created. By reaching in and continually lengthening those terms,
Congress is taking from the public an interest that the public
rightfully expected to get. The public rightfully expected to gain
free access to those works, to use them in new and creative and
innovative ways from the public domain.80
77

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
79
See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10(A), at
1-66.57 (2002) (“Congress is granted authority to legislate in a given field, it does not
follow that such a grant immunizes Congress from the limitations of the Bill of Rights,
including the First Amendment.”).
80
See Brief for the Petitioners at 9–11, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No.
01-618).
78
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Eric Eldred, the lead plaintiff, publishes public domain works
with annotations and links to their historical context on his
website, making them available to people who might not have had
access to the works or their context.81 Other plaintiffs and amici
restored old films that would otherwise have disintegrated denied
to the public; still others reprinted out-of-print music and books
and compilations of historical material.82 All of these groups,
waiting, preparing to use works when they entered the public
domain, instead had them snatched away for another twenty years
because corporations such as Disney had the stronger lobbyists in
Congress and wanted that extra revenue from exploiting Mickey
Mouse and similar properties.83
The argument about international harmonization proves too
much, because there are plenty of places where the CTEA created
more dissonance than harmony with Europe and other regions of
the world.84 As a sovereign nation we are accustomed to
promoting different goals through our unique copyright policy.
Instead, what we are really looking at is Congresswoman Mary
Bono’s statement, “Actually Sonny wanted copyright to last
forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate
the Constitution. . . . [T]here is also Jack Valenti’s proposal for
term to last forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look
at that next congress.”85 Or, as Peter Jaszi testified, Congress gave
Sonny the next-best thing, “a perpetual copyright on the
installment plan.”86
The original Copyright Act was far more limited in scope than
what we have now. It granted fourteen-year monopolies on the
81

See http://www.eldritchpress.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
See Brief of Amici Curiae the Internet Archive, Prelinger Archives, and Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at 3–5, Eldred (No. 01-618),
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/amici/internet-archive.html.
83
See HEINS, supra note 41, at 8–9.
84
See Dennis S. Karjala, Harmonization Chart Between U.S. and E.U. After Adoption
of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (May 15 2002), http://www.law.asu.
edu/HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/legmats/HarmonizationChartDS.
html.
85
144 CONG. REC. H9951 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bono).
86
Hearings on S. 483, supra note 18 (testimony of Professor Peter Jaszi, American
University Law School).
82

5 - PANEL II FORMAT

5/30/03 7:56 AM

794

[Vol. 13:771

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

right to publish, republish and vend books, charts, and maps.87
Now, 200 years later, copyright grants the author of any
workliterary,
musical,
dramatic,
visual,
sound
recordingsexclusive rights of reproduction, distribution,
preparation of derivative works, public performance and displays,
even digital transmissions of sound recordings, and all of this lasts
for life of the author plus seventy years (or ninety-five years for
works for hire), a far cry from the original fourteen-year monopoly
that the original framers saw implemented.88
But copyright is not meant to be absolute. While it is limited in
other ways than by termlimited by fair use, by idea-expression
distinctions, and by the first-sale doctrinethose do not go all the
way.89 They do not give us the freedom we need to make the
widest range of other creative uses of works. The reason those
limits are enough to satisfy the First Amendment is, in part,
because after a limited time, the copyright expires and the work
enters the public domain. Because after its copyright term ends,
the work is freely available to be built upon in variations on a
theme, to be put into derivative forms or annotated editions; to be
made a part of common culture, and celebrated and criticized in
that culture.90
Instead, the extensions that Congress has continually enacted
eleven times in the last forty years,91 reaching in and drawing out
the copyright term yet further, have denied us that essential limit
87

Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, §1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802).
See id.; HEINS, supra note 41, at 3–5 (discussing the purposes behind copyright law,
its extensions, and resulting problems).
89
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 109(a) (2000); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (“[C]opyright assures authors the right to their original
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information
conveyed by a work.”).
90
See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Free Software Foundation at 5, Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618) (“In the sphere of copyright, the limited
time requirement protects the public domain, by providing for its constant enrichment.”).
91
See Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998); Pub. L. No. 94-553 § 304, 90 Stat.
2572 (1976); Pub. L. No. 93-573 tit. I, § 104, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974); Pub. L. No. 92-566 §
1, 86 Stat. 1181 (1972); Pub. L. No. 92-170, 85 Stat. 490 (1971); Pub. L. No. 91-555, 84
Stat. 1441 (1970); Pub. L. No. 91-147, 83 Stat. 360 (1969); Pub. L. No. 90-416, 82 Stat.
397 (1968); Pub. L. No. 90-141, 81 Stat. 464 (1967); Pub. L. No. 89-142, 79 Stat. 581
(1965); Pub. L. No. 87-668, 76 Stat. 555 (1962).
88
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on copyright that lets it serve its purpose of enriching the public for
whose benefit it has served as an incentive to create in the first
place.
Art and literature are not created in vacuums. Musicians from
classical composers through folk, jazz, and rap have built upon the
themes developed by their predecessors; because artists draw upon
the work that comes before them; because literature reuses plots
and charactersDisney himself took Snow White and Cinderella,
and his company has taken Victor Hugo and the Little Mermaid,
and made his own creations from them, yet it now wants to stop us
from doing the same thing to Disney works.92
So the Eldred case is an important case for all of the works and
characters that it will restore to the public; for the chance that it
will give us to use not just those famous works like the Mickey
Mouse, but the tens of thousands of other works that are lying
fallow because no copyright owner has seen fit to exploit them.
The technology gives all of the public a chance to read, see and
hear those works and to make new creations from them.93
But even more, the Eldred case is important because it has
helped to catalyze a movement, a movement that builds upon work
that Eben has done with the Free Software Foundation,94 and
builds on the ideas of James Boyle and environmentalism for the

92

See SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS (Disney 1938) (adapted from the fairy
tale); CINDERELLA (Disney 1950); THE HUNCHBACK OF NOTRE DAME (Disney 1996)
(adapted from VICTOR HUGO, THE HUNCHBACK OF NOTRE DAME (1831)); THE LITTLE
MERMAID (Disney 1992) (adapted from Hans Christian Andersen, The Little Mermaid
(1836), in THE COMPLETE HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN FAIRY TALES (Lily Owens ed.
1981) .
93
See Brief for the Petitioners at 5, Eldred (No. 01-618) (“By using the technology of
the Internet, [Eldred] is able to build texts that are available freely around the world. By
integrating search technologies and links, his texts enable students and scholars to study
these works in ways that would be impossible with printed books.”).
94
See Free Software Movement, About Free Software, Philosophy of the GNU Project,
at http://www.fsf.org/philosophy/philosophy.html#TOCAboutFreeSoftware (last visited
Apr. 6, 2003) (“Free Software is a matter of freedom: people should be free to use
software in all the ways that are socially useful. Software differs from material objects—
such as chairs, sandwiches, and gasoline—in that it can be copied and changed much
more easily. These possibilities make software as useful as it is; we believe software
users should be able to make use of them.”).
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Net.95 It is a movement to recognize once again the importance of
the free flow of information against this propertization and
privatization of cultural expression. It has built a movement that
camped out on the Supreme Court steps on the principle that socalled intellectual property should not limit free discussion.96
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Thank you, Wendy. Our final
speaker is David Carson. David obtained a Bachelor of Arts degree
and then a Master of Arts degree from Stanford. He then went to
Harvard Law School. David first practiced with the Beverly Hills
entertainment law firm of Cooper Epstein & Hurewitz. He moved
to New York and to Schwab Goldberg Price & Dannay, a very
well-known, outstanding copyright firm, where he was a partner.
From there he moved to become the General Counsel of the
U.S. Copyright Office. The General Counsel is the principal legal
officer with responsibility for the Office’s regulatory activities,
litigation, administration of the copyright law, and providing
liaison on legal matters between the Office and Congress,
Department of Justice, and other agencies of government. While
in practice, he wrote briefs and argued many cases in the copyright
area.
Let us see what his position is. David?
MR. CARSON: One of my purposes today is not to tell you
what my position is, but we will see if I can manage that.
I should start with a couple of disclaimers. I am not here to
speak on behalf of the United States Government. Certainly, while
this case is pending in the Supreme Court, there is only one person
who is authorized to speak on behalf of the United States
Government, the Solicitor General. He did so eloquently a month
ago, and I cannot add anything to that, and if I tried, I would get in
trouble with the Solicitor General’s Office.

95

See James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?,
47 DUKE L.J. 87 (1997).
96
See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners at 41, Eldred (No. 01-618) (“By retroactively
extending copyright terms, Congress is directly re-allocating the right to speak. It is
choosing favored speakers . . . and disfavoring other speakers who would, but for this
regulation, be permitted to develop derivative works, or perform free of the restrictions of
copyright.”).
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I am not here to speak in defense of the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act. Actually, I am disappointed; I thought Chuck
was going to do that, so I thought he would take some pressure off
me. But maybe no one here wants to defend it. I certainly never
have, and I doubt that I ever will.
But I have no problem at all defending the constitutionality of
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act. And if you accept
for a moment the policy propositions urged by the people on my
left and my right, to say the least, I think reasonable minds can
differ on those policy propositions.
If you take seriously the arguments made in the briefs as to
why copyright term extension was a horrible idea, at the end of the
day my response is that as a matter of constitutional law, Congress
has the power to get it wrong. So if Congress got it wrong, so be
it. There is nothing in the Copyright Clause and there is nothing in
the First Amendment that tells Congress it cannot get it wrong.97
And basically, I think most of the arguments—and certainly the
best arguments, I have seen—are policy arguments, not
constitutional arguments.98
I would commend to you a couple of articles that I reread on
the way up here by a couple of distinguished members of the New
York legal academic scene.
One was by Jane Ginsburg at a symposium at Cardozo about
two years ago.99 I don’t mean to slight the other participantsBill
Patry, Wendy Gordon, and Arthur Millerall of whom had very
insightful comments, but Professor Ginsburg’s really struck a
chord with me. What she said essentially was that copyright term
extension was a lousy idea but that it was not unconstitutional.
Congress had the power to do that.100
The other thing she saidand I am putting this in my own
words now, certainly not her words, and it is something that
97

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Brief for the Petitioners at 5, Eldred (No. 01-618).
99
Jane C. Ginsburg et al., The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How
Long Is Too Long, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 695–704 (2000).
100
See id. at 697–704 (discussing policy concerns about the CTEA but also discussing
why it could survive constitutional scrutiny).
98
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concerns me greatlyis that she thought copyright term extension
was probably a mistake.101 Why was it a mistake? Well, look to
my left and look to my right and you will see why it was a mistake.
What the Copyright Term Extension Act turned into was, in
my words, a poster child for everything that is wrong with
copyright law. It became basically a banner behind which
opponents of copyright law could rally. And it certainly has been
very effective in doing that. I think that were it not for copyright
term extension—something that is simple for people to understand
and people to take a position on—the folks who are opposing all
sorts of legislation and just in general have qualms about the level
of copyright protection we find in our society today—and I think
that describes the people to my left [Professor Eben Moglen] and
my right [Wendy Seltzer], but not my far left [Charles
Sims]those people would have a much harder time getting any
traction. So the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act in
many respects was a gift to them.
I am not sure in the long run whether it is going to make any
difference. I wouldn’t expect it to make a difference in the Court,
but we will see. I am not going to offer any predictions there. I
predicted a year ago that there was not a chance that the Court
would take the case because there were no serious constitutional
issues. I have retired from the business of predicting what the
Court is going to do.
Observe, however, that two years ago, the Court granted
certiorari in New York Times Co. v. Tasini, and yet we had, I think,
a 7-2 vote to affirm.102 So the fact that the Court takes a case does
not necessarily mean the Court is ready to reverse. Our most
recent experience with a copyright case gives those folks who
would like to see the Court affirm some reason to hope.
Anyway, I would commend to you Jane Ginsburg’s remarks,
which you can find in the Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law
Review.103

101
102
103

See id. at 698–701.
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
See Ginsburg et al., supra note 99.
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Another piece that I would commend to you is something that
was published in FindLaw on October 24, 2002 by Professor Marci
Hamilton of Cardozo.104 Her arguments were in some respects the
same as Professor Ginsburg’s, that copyright term extension is bad
policythat’s her first headingbut she just doesn’t see the
constitutional argument, and in many respects says the same kinds
of things I think we heard Chuck say already.105
She did make one observation that had not occurred to me yet,
and I cannot say it is the be-all and end-all or that it really resolves
the issue for me, but it was one that, as I said, had not occurred to
me yet and one that I think is worth thinking about. If there is one
thing that is probably the primary item on the U.S. Government’s
agenda with respect to international copyright, and it is one thing
that most people I think can understand, it is our efforts to stamp
out piracy worldwide106and piracy not necessarily, and not even
primarily at this point, on the Internet, although that is becoming a
very large part of the problem107but piracy just in terms of
physical media. You go to certain parts of the world and you
cannot find a legitimate DVD or CD of music or of a motion
picture because the pirated stuff has just flooded the market, and it
is so cheap and the quality is good enough that the legitimate
copyright owners simply cannot make a go of it.108
Well, one thing that Professor Hamilton points out is that as a
consequence of a reversal of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in the
104

Marci Hamilton, Mickey Mouse Versus Wired Magazine: The Supreme Court
Considers Whether a Law Extending the Copyright Term Is Constitutional, FindLaw’s
Writ: Legal Commentary, at http://writ.findlaw.com/hamilton/20021024.html (Oct. 24,
2002).
105
See id.
106
See id. (arguing that interference with the CTEA’s policy of copyright harmonization
would allow many works still copyrighted in Europe to enter the public domain in the
United States—“a recipe for piracy, and resulting international tension”).
107
See Michael J. Muerer, Focus on Cyberlaw, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and
Piracy: Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845, 881 (1997) (“It is
easy to see that the Internet raises the threat of piracy. . . .”).
108
See Christian John Pantages, Comment, Avast Ye, Hollywood! Digital Motion Piracy
Comes of Age, 15 TRANSNAT’L L. 155, 178 (2002) (“Even for a powerful organization
like the [Motion Picture Association of America], enforcing the intellectual property
rights of its members outside the United States is difficult or nearly impossible.”); Susan
Tiefenbrun, Piracy of Intellectual Property in China and the Former Soviet Union and Its
Effects upon International Trade: A Comparison, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1998).
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Eldred case would be that our copyright term here would revert to
a shorter term than the term in Europe.109 “So what?” you might
say.
Well, one response to that is we may find ourselves becoming a
piracy haven, at least vis-à-vis Europe, which is the most important
market for the United States and with whom we generally try to
have good relations.110 The notion behind that is that European
works are protected in their own territory for life plus seventy.111
And by the way, just as a footnote, an aside, I think Professor
Moglen has his history wrong. The European Union Directive on
Copyright Term Extension was issued in 1993.112 It did not come
out of the blue. It was in the making for quite some time.113
I think you can accept Professor Moglen’s characterization of
the motives of the people in the private sector who asked Congress
to enact the Copyright Term Extension Act. I do not think there is
anything unusual about private parties who have an economic
interest in legislation pushing for that legislation. But I do not
think it is fair to say that the rationale that Congress adopted, or the
rationale that was urged to Congress in adopting this, was simply
to help Michael Eisner. The rationale was, and the motivating
force, and I suppose from Professor Moglen’s point of view
perhaps, the excuse for enacting the law, was that Europe had in
fact gone to life plus seventy and this was the trend. This was the
direction in which things were going. We were going to get there
sooner or later and because we are a leader in trying to have
modern and appropriate levels of intellectual property protection
worldwide, we should get on that train as well.114
Let me return to the point that Professor Hamilton was making.
If suddenly, and particularly with the Internet, all of these works
109

See Hamilton, supra note 104.
Id.
111
Id.
112
Directive 93/98, supra note 5.
113
Tim Dabin, EC Must Unify Copyright Laws, BILLBOARD, October 16, 1993, at 8 (The
“European Commission has been masticating the directive that would produce [copyright
harmonization] for years now.”).
114
Brief for the Respondent at 25–26, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No.
01-618).
110
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that are still under copyright in Europe are suddenly freely
available in the United States and freely available from websites in
the United States, we are going to have problems with our friends
in Europe.115
Now, is that a reason to extend copyright, in and of itself? I
would not pretend that it is. But it was an original thought that I
think was one that would certainly give those folks in the United
States responsible for our international copyright relations some
pause.
I meant to bring a letter that the Register of Copyrights
received earlier this year, and I discovered I forgot to slip it in to
my briefcase, but I called and had someone dictate it to me.
I should note that the Copyright Office in 1995, before my
time, at the time that this legislation was first pending, did come
out in favor of term extension, and the Register of Copyrights gave
some very lengthy testimony in which, I think it is fair to say, she
ultimately said as a matter of policy it is a close call, but on
balance we think it makes sense.116
This year she got a letter. I will read it to you:
Dear Ms. Peters: I have been spending a great deal of
time reviewing testimony on the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act, for obvious reasons. I was struck in
reading your testimony by how extraordinarily balanced
and conscientious you were, to emphasize the costs of term
extension while also adding your views about the benefits.
This was more than completeness. It reflected an integrity
that was too rare in contexts like that. Thank you.

115

See Hamilton, supra note 104 (“Striking down a law that strikes an international
balance is not something any court could or should feel very comfortable doing,
especially on the slender reed of the argument that ‘70 plus life’ is, in effect, no longer
‘limited.’”).
116
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 989 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
1–22 (1995) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 989] (testimony of Marybeth Peters, Register
of Copyright and Associate Librarian for Copyrights Services).
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With warm regards,
Lawrence Lessig117
We should not pretend that copyright term extension was
without costs. Of course it was, and we have heard people tell us
what those costs were.118 On balance, Congress made the policy
judgment, which I think Congress had absolute power to do, that
term extension was appropriate. It was within Congress’s power to
do that. And while I am not going to predict what the Court will
do, I guess I am not terribly worried.
A final word: Professor Moglen said this is not a very
important case. I think the answer is that it depends. If the Court
affirms, then I would agree, I think this is not a very important
case; it is just one of those little historical footnotes. If the Court
reversesand, of course, it depends on the ways in which the
Court reversesthen this is an incredibly important case, because
to do that, I think, the Court is going to have to challenge the
conceptions we have had about copyright—and that will not come
as a great shock or disappointment to some of the people sitting up
there—conceptions we have had for a couple of centuries.
It is hard for me to imagine how the Court can reverse without
seriously tying Congress’s hands in the future to amend copyright
lawand not just with respect to term, but with respect to all sorts
of other things, such as scope of copyrightin ways that I think
many of us would live to regret if that is the way it turns out.
Thank you.

117

Letter from Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford School of Law, to
Marybeth Peters, Registrar of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office (Mar. 19, 2002) (on file
with David O. Carson).
118
Id. at 64–65.
There are some costs to term extension, however, and they must be weighed
against the benefits. While it does appear likely that as a result of term
extension, some items may become more expensive, the impact on individual
consumers should be minimal. . . . When it comes to choosing whether to
protect authors or slightly decrease costs associated with making materials
available, the balance should be in favor of authors.
Id.
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PROFESSOR HANSEN: First, let me just say everyone at this
table seems to think that Sonny Bono, one of my heroes, and his
act
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: He was a very nice man.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I do not know. He could have been a
jerk. But I certainly  you know, I am not saying
MR. SIMS: Do not speak ill of the dead.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: The point seems to be that most, if
not all, of the speakers think that a twenty year extension is bad
law and bad policy. Implicit, in this is an acceptance of the public
domain as an unqualified good. Moreover, some seem to think that
those who want protection are bad or even evil and should die by
hitting a tree. Some critics of copyright are really talking about the
capitalist system.
But back to the attack upon copyright. It is not an evil
monopoly. It is not even a monopoly. Copyright protection does
not give the power to control prices or exclude competitors.
Copyright is just a bundle of rights with regard to some intangible
res or thing. In this sense it is no different from forms of tangible
property. A copyright is ownership and ownership is not the same
as a monopoly. It is important to keep in mind that copyright
protection only prevents copying. A third party can completely
independently create the exact same work.119
Now, they used to say, “Those who can do, do, and those who
cannot do teach.” Well, those who can create, create, and those
who can’t, do the public domain. It is somewhat sad that
reproducing works that are out of copyright is somehow viewed as
equally or even more meritorious than creating those works in the
first place.

119

See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 103 n.16 (2d Cir. 1951).
Copyright is, in fact, only a negative right to prevent the appropriation of the labours of
an author by another. If it could be shown that two precisely similar works were in fact
produced wholly independently of one another, the author of the work that was published
first would have no right to restrain the publication by the other author of that author’s
independent and original work.
Id. (quoting W. COPINGER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 2 (7th ed. 1936)).
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In fact, getting twenty years more copyright protection for
works will have little effect. For most works that old, no one will
want to use them. For those works that will be used, probably no
one will be around to care about the copyright and for those who
are around and care, most will be happy to give a royalty-free
licenses. And if someone wants to be paid, fine—pass on the
costs to the consumer.
And how many people who be using these very old works on
the Web or elsewhere will care about licenses and clearing rights?
I mean, most of the stuff you get on these websites treat all works,
current and old, as if they are in the public.
MR. CARSON: Is there a moderator in the room?
PROFESSOR HANSEN: No. We have a bunch of people
saying this extension is horrible, just horrible. Twenty more years
of deprivation. Like Chicken Little, they think the sky is falling
but it is not. In fact, the Act will lead to increased revenue from
Europe to United States which means more jobs and more tax,
revenue. Many more people will be benefited indirectly from the
increased revenue than will be deprived of access to works by the
twenty year extension. Moreover, the some of the increased
revenue may lead to the funding of new creative projects.
Some say this is all about Steamboat Willie? Do you think
anyone in the public cares about Steamboat Willie? He does look
like the Mickey we know and love today and he is not alike in
character. But Steamboat Willie is not Mickey Mouse and his
going into the public domain would not have threatened the
commercial viability of the Mickey Mouse character of today.
So what are the effects when a work goes into the public
domain? Are they all good? Let’s say a play goes into the public
domain. A producer puts it on. Is the ticket cheaper? All the
public domain accomplishes is that the producer is able to put on
the play without obtaining a license or paying the creator.120 Is
120

See Hearings on S. 483, supra note 18, at 15–16 (1995). Irwin Karp states, “[T]he
advantage of the ‘public domain’ as a device for making works more available to the
public is highly overrated; especially if availability is equated to ‘low cost’ to the public.”
Jack Valenti states that public domain works do not circulate more widely or cheaply
under actual marketplace conditions. Id. at 41–42.
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that good? It might mean that producer will be drawn to revivals
of works in the public domain rather than take risks with new
works. Do we want a lot of works that were created 100 years ago
repackaged and performed or distributed, or do we want that
money and energy going into new works and to new creators?
We are told that the public domain is great for consumers. As
we have just seen, if they want new works it is not. And it they
want old works they will not pay less for them even if they are in
the public domain.121 In short, I am just saying there is something
to be said for protection and there are downsides to the public
domain.
You are going to have your chance to comment. But just
before we forget the thought, let’s have some predictions on what
the Supreme Court will do. It will be interesting to see later on
whether our predictions are right.
Chuck, do you have a prediction?
MR. SIMS: Oh, yes. I think the D.C. Circuit’s decision will be
affirmed 8-1.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Stevens is the dissent?
MR. SIMS: I actually think it will be Breyer.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Okay.
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: The majority opinion is by John
Paul Stevens for five or six. The primary dissent is written by
Justice Ginsberg and is joined by the Chief Justice, Justice
Thomas, and possibly Justice Kennedy. The rest of the votes are
ours.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I didn’t hear all of that.

121

See generally Hearings on H.R. 989, supra note 116, at 238–39 (statement of Quincy
Jones) (“The alternative to copyright protection is, of course, that works will fall into the
public domain. While the term ‘public domain’ implies that the ultimate public, the
consumer, will have free and easy access to creative works, this is really not the case.
The price of a quality compact disc recording of Beethoven is no less expensive than the
price of a Pearl Jam CD. The record company that manufactures the CD does not have to
pay royalties to the Beethoven estate and these cost savings are not passed on to the
consumer.”).
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PROFESSOR MOGLEN: I said the majority opinion is written
by John Paul Stevens.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I heard that.
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: The primary dissent is written by
Justice Ginsberg. She is joined by the Chief Justice, who assigned
it to her, Justice Thomas, and possibly Justice Kennedy. The rest
are ours.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Okay. Do you have doubts about
anything, Eben?
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: Many things, one is which if you
have ever been in any contact with the Internet.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: You mean your thought is I haven’t
yet been infected?
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: My thought is you haven’t even
been impinged upon.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I haven’t even been what?
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: Noticed.
Since I don’t quite
comprehend why it is that you think that people pay for public
domain literature, which they do not.
MR. SIMS: Of course they do. I mean, in any bookstore
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: They do if they buy their books in
bookstores. But since public domain literature has zero marginal
cost, they do not have to pay for it at all if they do not want to.
They voluntarily pay publishers for the convenience of emitting
public literature conveniently-sized and bound paper, which is also
what they will do in order to get such Satyajit Ray movies that they
love or Mick Jagger music that they want.
We are not talking about whether works will get created. We
are talking about whether exclusion from those works will be
decreed for those who cannot pay. The real subject of the
conversation is not wheat. The real subject of the conversation is
something that everybody can get for nothing if anybody has it
and, therefore, whether it is fair to exclude people.
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PROFESSOR HANSEN: Is this the majority or the dissent,
Eben? Which opinion is this? All I asked you for was the vote.
You can come back and give your
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: I gave you the vote. You asked me
further questions, and then you asked me whether I
PROFESSOR HANSEN: All right. Then it goes on to David.
Pass the baton, all right.
MR. CARSON: I am going to drop the baton. I don’t think I
can make any predictions.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Okay.
Wendy, do you have a vote?
MS. SELTZER: Well, I don’t have the details worked out the
way Eben has. I would say Eldred by six or seven.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Well, I don’t like to go out on a limb,
but I think definitely Eldred is going to lose. I think Stevens will
be in dissent. I think Breyer might be in dissent. I have trouble
seeing any of the others clearly in dissent. I think clearly in the
majority are the hard core of O’Connor, Ginsberg, and Souter.
And I think you probably have the Chief Justice in there. You are
probably also going to have Scaliaor maybe not Scalia, but you
will have Thomas.
So I have real trouble seeing any clear dissenters, other than
Stevens. Justice Stevens, as I see it, is a 1950s antitrust lawyer,
and as William Wordsworth said, the child is father of the man.122
Translated to lawyers means: how you grew up professionally and
what influenced your views at an early stageand I’m really
concerned about how you grew up, Ebenaffect you and your
views throughout your legal or judicial career. Stevens in practice
was imbued with the 1950s antitrust view of intellectual property,
and he has been consistent ever since, voting against the
intellectual property owner in almost every case.123

122

See William Wordsworth, My Heart Leaps Up (1802), available at http://www.
bartleby.com/145/ww194.html.
123
See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). In this
case, Justice Stevens delivered the 5-4 majority opinion that the sale of videotape
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Breyer, of course, had his piece, The Uneasy Case for
Copyright,124 but other than that, I have trouble finding other
justices in dissent. But time will tell, and I absolutely agree it is
difficult to predict.
Now we will go through one more time for people’s rebuttals,
comments, or whatever.
Eben, why don’t you continue with yours?
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: No, I pass.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Are you in a snit now, Eben, or
what?
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: Certainly not.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Okay, good.
Wendy, why don’t you?
MS. SELTZER: Well, I was anxious to jump in on the value of
revivals of works in the public domain. I think plays are the
perfect example of where we see a wider range of performances
once a work has come out of the exclusive control of its copyright
holder. Suddenly, we can see Porgy and Bess with a cast reimagined, not only the all-black cast that the Gershwin estate
mandates;125 we can see women in Waiting for Godot. We can see
characters in different contexts and critical studies with
interpretations that might not have the approval of the author or his
estate.126 So its not only a matter of how much the performance
costs—if we’re paying the actors as much, great for the actors—we

recovered to the general public does not constitute contributory infringement of
copyrights. Id. at 428–56.
124
Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
125
Dinitia Smith, Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey Mouse Joins the
Fray, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1998, at B7 (“Marc G. Gershwin, a nephew of George and
Ira Gershwin and a co-trustee of the Gershwin Family Trust, said: ‘ . . . [W]e’ve always
licensed “Porgy and Bess” for stage performance only with a black cast and chorus. That
could be debased. Or someone could turn “Porgy and Bess” into rap music.’”).
126
See, e.g., SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001)
(allowing publication and distribution of ALICE RANDALL, THE WIND DONE GONE: A
NOVEL (2001), a parody of MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND (Scribner 1996)
(1936)).
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are getting a very different experience once the work has emerged
from copyright’s control.
Returning to the point about trade balance, literary works are
not wheat. When we have art and literature that can be given to
everyone and not diminish in their value, our goal should be to get
those out to as many people as possible and not to create an
artificial scarcity so that a few can make money off them.127 We
should be celebrating the chance that technology gives us to
disseminate these intellectual products more widely.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: David, do you have anything to say?
MR. CARSON: Well, there were a few comments I heard that I
guess I would like to respond to.
First of all, it does not shock copyright lawyers that there is a
First Amendment at all. I think Chuck is a pretty good example of
the marriage of copyright and the First Amendment. I have done
my share of First Amendment work, and many, many copyright
lawyers I know have. That should not be surprising, because a
good deal of First Amendment work is done by lawyers
representing the media. Media does happen to own copyrights.
There is nothing inconsistent between the notion of copyright and
the First Amendment.128 In fact, it is a pretty nice marriage that
works pretty well.
I would argue, and I am certainly not the firstcertainly the
court in the District of Columbia Circuit agreedthat copyright is
an engine of First Amendment expression and that the doctrines
within copyright, such as fair use,129 such as the idea/expression
dichotomy,130 such as the merger doctrine,131 very, very easily
127

See generally LESSIG, supra note 40 (arguing that the increased power wielded over
the Internet by large corporate interests threatens to close off important avenues of
thought and free expression).
128
See generally Henry S. Hoberman, Copyright and the First Amendment: Freedom or
Monopoly of Expression?, 14 PEPP. L. REV. 571 (1987) (discussing how courts and
legislatures have attempted to reconcile the tensions between the Copyright Clause and
the First Amendment).
129
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 669
(1994).
130
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
131
See Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 36 (1st Cir. 2001)
(explaining that the merger doctrine applies when “[t]here is essentially only one way to

5 - PANEL II FORMAT

5/30/03 7:56 AM

810

[Vol. 13:771

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

accommodate all the First Amendment interests that are necessary
to accommodate.
We heard Steamboat Willie mentioned a couple of times. We
have heard about how Walt Disney just raided the public domain
and then created his own copyrighted works out of it. Okay, fair
point. I don’t know whether this is true, but I have been told that
Steamboat Willie was in fact a parody of Buster Keaton’s motion
picture Steamboat Bill.132 I do not know whether that is true, but
that is what I am told. Certainly at the time Steamboat Willie was
made, Steamboat Bill was protected by copyright. I am not aware
of any reports of Buster Keaton, or whatever studio produced
Steamboat Bill, filing suit against Walt Disney for copyright
infringement. Why? Probably because of the fair use doctrine,
which very comfortably accommodates parodies.133 Look at the
Wind Done Gone case, if you have any doubts about that.134
So the notion that there is this opposition between copyright
and the First Amendment is just fundamentally false. I think many
of us who practice copyright law would find some other job if we
were persuaded that copyright was somehow inconsistent with the
First Amendment.
Wendy mentioned something that appears throughout the
briefs, and has appeared throughout the briefs in this case since it
was filed in the district courtshe should know better and Larry
Lessig should know betterthis thing about Congress extending
copyright term eleven times in forty years. It is a recurring theme,
and it is there for a reason. It is there because the larger theme that
they are trying to argue is that Congress cannot help itself; every
time you look at it, it turns around and extends copyright term.
This isI think she quoted Peter Jaszi“a perpetual copyright on
the installment plan.”135

express an idea, the idea and its expression are inseparable and copyright is no bar to
copying that expression.”).
132
See Lawrence Lessig, Keynote Address at the Open Source Convention (Aug. 15,
2002), available at http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/policy/2002/08/15/lessig.html.
133
See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
134
Id.
135
Hearings on S. 483, supra note 18.
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There is so little truth to that that it is laughable, and it is
demonstrably wrong. Of those eleven times in the last forty years,
I think nine were interim extensions which were based upon
Congress’s recognition that it had already determined in the
context of a very, very lengthyyears and years and
yearsprocess of omnibus revision of the copyright law to move
from our two-term process, where we had two terms of twentyeight years each, to the Berne standard of life plus fifty.136 Once
that decision was made, and prior to ironing out all the other
wrinkles that had to be taken care of in order to enact an omnibus
copyright revision, which finally came in 1976,137 Congress
decided, starting in 1961, that we were moving to life plus fifty and
therefore preserved the copyrights of works about to fall into the
public domain because it had already decided they were entitled to
life plus fifty, and because it had already decided they were
entitled to life plus fifty.”138
So for several years, Congress had one- or two-year
extensions.139 To say that these are each an independent extension
and an example of Congress’s profligate extension of copyright
term is just a lie. It is nothing short of a lie.
It was simply Congress’s placeholder in order to memorialize
something that had already been decided. Congress extended
copyright in 1976, fair enough.140 It extended it in 1998, fair
enough.141
The notion that this is perpetual copyright on the installment
plan again is demonstrably false. If it was an attempt to do that, at
least, Congress failed miserably. Works passed into the public
domain shortly after the 1976 Copyright Act went into effect,
notwithstanding Congress’s extension of copyright term, and they
136

See Ginsburg, supra note 99 at 693.
See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–914 (1976).
138
See id. § 303.
139
See Pub. L. No. 92-566 § 1, 86 Stat. 1181 (1972); Pub. L. No. 92-170, 85 Stat. 490
(1971); Pub. L. No. 91-555, 84 Stat. 1441 (1970); Pub. L. No. 91-147, 83 Stat. 360
(1969); Pub. L. No. 90-416, 82 Stat. 397 (1968); Pub. L. No. 90-141, 81 Stat. 464 (1967);
Pub. L. No. 89-142, 79 Stat. 581 (1965); Pub. L. No. 87-668, 76 Stat. 555 (1962).
140
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–914.
141
CTEA, Pub. L. No. 105-298 tit. 1, 112 Stat. 2827 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C. (Supp. V 2000)).
137
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continued to go into the public domain every year until the Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act was enacted in 1998.142
And yes (with one exception), works will not go into the public
domain due to expiration of copyright term until that twenty-year
period has occurred, and you can determine for yourself whether
that is regrettable or not. But it is hardly perpetual copyright on
the installment plan.
I, for one, would be shocked if Congress in our lifetimes ever
extended copyright term again, and I see no evidence for anyone to
believe that that is on anyone’s agenda.
I will mention that, come January 1 of next year, a vast number
of works will enter the public domain due to the expiration of
copyright term.143 Section 303 of the Copyright Act provides that
any work created before 1978 that is unpublished, and which
therefore on January 1, 1978, was converted from a perpetual
common law copyright to a statutory copyright, to a statutory
copyright will go into the public domain starting on January 1 of
next year if the standard term of life plus seventy has already
passed and if the work has not been published prior to the end of
this year.144 An uncountable number of works will pass into the
public domain by virtue of that.
There was one provision, by the way, that in the original
version of the Copyright Term Extension Act would have
postponed that date for another ten years.145 In part because of the
Copyright Office, and in part because Congress, and in part
because Congress just saw the justice of it, the decision was made
not to do that and to keep this date as it is. So works will continue
to go into the public domain.
I could say more, but I think I have probably taken up more
than my allotted time for the moment.
142

See id.
Press Release, U.S. Copyright Office, Certain Unpublished, Unregistered Works
Enter Public Domain (Jan. 13, 2003), http://www.copyright.gov/pr/pdomain.html. Any
work that was neither published nor registered for copyright as of Jan. 1, 1978, and
whose author died before 1933 entered the public domain on Jan. 1, 2003, unless it was
published on or before Dec. 31, 2002. Id.
144
Id.
145
See S. 483, 104th Cong. § 2(c)(1) (1995), S. REP. NO 104-315, at 3 (1995).
143
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PROFESSOR HANSEN: Okay.
Chuck?
MR. SIMS: Yes. I want to make some comments about some
of the points David made, because they were really the points that I
think are fundamental here too.
I am trained as a First Amendment lawyer. At the ACLU,
actually while I was still there, the Harper & Row case about
Gerald Ford came up.146 There was a huge struggle within the
ACLU at the time. I didn’t know that I was going to be eventually
getting some revenues from the motion picture studios or any other
content providers. I was making an ACLU public interest salary.
But there was a huge battle within the organization about which
side of that case to be on or whether to do it at all.
Eventually, the organization did decide to support The Nation’s
fair use claim.
I happen to have felt at the time that the other argument was
right, because I think the notion which Wendy kept repeating, that
there is something fundamentally inconsistent between the First
Amendment and copyright law, that the copyright law is somehow
infringing First Amendment rights which we can only allow on
sufferance for the exact moment in time at which we must, is
fundamentally wrong.
She kept talking aboutthis is the phrase she used
repeatedly“propertization and privatization of ideas.” There is
nothing about either the Copyright Term Extension Act or
copyright law generally that does that.
It is true that for people who think that because it can be done it
must be done, that there is something that feels binding about
copyright law. The silliest amicus brief I have ever seen in my life
actually was a brief filed by Charles Nesson, who I like quite a lot,
but this is a brief that I think is indicative of the fundamental error
on that side of the table.147
146

See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., Inc., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
Brief of Professor Charles R. Nesson as Amicus Curiae, Universal City Studios, Inc.
v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (No. 00-CV-277), http://eon.law.harvard.edu/
openlaw/DVD/filings/NY/0510-amicus.html.
147
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His brief was filed in the DVD case, which involved
encryption of DVDs, was essentially as follows: I teach trial
practice at Harvard Law School. In trial practice I find it really
important to show my students the key courtroom movie scenes,
the scenes from Twelve Angry Men,148 Paul Newman’s scenes from
The Verdict,149 other things like that. This law violates my First
Amendment rights because I cannot burn these scenes and put
them on a CD and conveniently show them.150
Well, the ideas of Gershwin’s works or of Virginia Woolf’s
works, which are now going to be under copyright for some more
years, or Robert Frost’s poetryI am just looking down at a list of
works covered by the Sonny Bono Act which we included as an
appendix to our brief151William Faulkner’s novels,
Hemingway’s novelsthose of you who think that somehow your
First Amendment rights are being violated by the fact that those
works are in copyright, or your interests and free expression are
somehow hampered, I don’t understand that argument.
Anybody can go buy Hemingway, anybody can go buy
Faulkner. I do not think that the interest in having other people do
Faulkner in black-face instead of white-face, or do “Porgy and
Bess” with a South African white cast, or whatever it might be,
makes any sense at all.
The arguments, the ideas, in all of these works can be written
about, can be talked about, can be taught. But there is no
meaningful infringement on freedom of speech or on any principle
of freedom of speech that I understand by the existence of
copyright or by its term.
If the fact that To the Lighthouse is under copyright today is
not a violation of the First Amendment, I do not know why
keeping it for another twenty years under copyright is.

148

TWELVE ANGRY MEN (MGM 1957).
THE VERDICT (20th Century Fox 1982).
150
Brief of Professor Charles R. Nesson as Amicus Curiae, Universal City Studios (No.
00-CV-277).
151
See Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Publishers et al. app. at 1ap–2ap,
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618).
149
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I dare say that the argument that the motion picture studios
made, which is that there will be more money invested in film
preservation and dissemination of preserved films, more of that
available, as a matter of economic theory, certainly as a matter of
the framers’ preconception, if we have exclusive rights than if we
do not, makes a lot of sense to me.152 It is certainly the assumption
that the framers had.153
The other point I think I want to make is a point that both Eben
and Wendy made that I also think is really fundamental here.
There is always a reference in these discussions to the grab for
control, the grab for control so that there will be a pay-for-use
world. I guess that if you think that is what is going on, if you
think that is what is underlying, the secret levers that are
underlying these debates, have to do with Jack Valenti’s or
Michael Eisner’s mania for more and more power, you will end up
where they end up.
I suggest that there is another model that bears a lot more
relationship to reality in thinking about this, which is that what is
happening in Congress and in these debates does not reflect a grab
for more power; it reflects the insecurity of those whose ability to
extract the revenues that copyright law offers is more and more
threatened and is leakier and leakier by the day.
And so what is from one point of view this mania for a payper-use world is from the other side, watching what has happened
with Napster, the motion picture industry or the book industry
worrying about being Napsterized, and efforts, whether
technologically or through new kinds of legislation like the DMCA
or maybe extension of term, to try to preserve a portion of the
revenues that they were promised, that they counted on, and that
are leaking away by teen-age hackers who because it can be done
think that they have a right to do it.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Okay. We are going to open it up
now to questions.
152

See Brief for the Respondent at 34, Eldred (No. 01-618) (“Applying the CTEA’s
copyright term to subsisting copyrights also enhances the incentive for copyright holders
‘to restore older works and further disseminate them to the public.’”).
153
See Brief for the Respondent at 31–32, Eldred (No. 01-618).
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Let me just say one thing. I agree with Wendy that one
advantage of works going into the public domain is you can then
have different versions or derivative works that allow people with
different views to make statements that may be impossible to make
by simply creating a new work. The problem is that I do not think
as a practical matter this happens very often. All right. Why don’t
we go out to questions from the audience. State your name and if
you have an affiliation.
QUESTIONER: My name is Ting Kwok. I go to Law School
here.
I just wanted, first, to disabuse the moderator’s notion of
saying that eliminating copyrights and putting them in the public
domain would not lower the price of tickets because if the charge
for the use of the copyright were a per-use charge, that would
either shift up or down the marginal cost curve. If there are any
economists around here, that would mean that the price would go
down with a lower or no fee.
But there is something else. There is a benefit of being able to
restrict use, in that if you were a consumer of this type of material,
a scholarly consumer that needed to look at the footnotes and stuff
like that, if the work itself was not something like Plato, which was
very well-recognizedthere would be only one version, so it
would be much easier to look things up. That is a very minor
benefit. But I am not saying that it is going to be eitherit
depends on who the consumer is as to whether or not I think it
would be beneficial to have stronger or weaker copyright
protection.
But my question is: Have you noticed the absence of
Schnapper from the petitioner’s brief, and whether or not you think
that means that Lessig has just given up on an argument? If you
look at the appeals court opinion, there seems to be a little bit of a
hissy fit about whether or not Schnapper applies. Sentelle says one
thing and Ginsburg says something else.154 So if you could
comment on Schnapper.
154

See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the holding of Schnapper [v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1981),]
was that “[C]ongress need not ‘require that each copyrighted work be shown to promote
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MR. SIMS: Well, at the Supreme Court nobody cares about
D.C. Circuit precedent, so in the D.C. Circuit it was a big deal, but
once it got to the Supreme Court, they couldn’t care less.
There are a bunch of studies on book pricing, and all of them
show that book prices for works out of copyrightbooks by
Hawthorne, whateverdo not differ markedly or meaningfully at
all from works that are in copyright.155 I think that was the basis of
Hugh’s suggestion. I would assume that whether or not there is a
copyright expiration, the fact is that consumers do not get the
benefit of a lowered price reflecting some sort of copyright
interest. It sounds logical. I’m sure economists think that it ought
to happen, but it does not in the real world.
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: Assuming no change in the means of
distribution, which is of course the whole point. The change in the
mode of distribution is revolutionary in its nature. It is a shift of
the kind that economists treat as long-run change due to
technological adjustment. What it does is to eliminate all of those
inflexibilities in distribution, like bookstores and publishers, the
result of which is that the price of the public domain literature goes
to marginal cost.
If you want it as bits on a screen, the marginal cost is zero. If
you want it on paper, the marginal cost is what it costs for print-ondemand services, to which the publishers, knowing that book

the useful arts,’” and “[i]nsofar as [the introductory language of the Copyright Clause] is
taken to be anything more than the determination concerning that limited analysis, it is
not a holding but simply dicta (perhaps obiter dicta) and not binding on future panels”)
(quoting Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir.
1979)), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003). See also id. at 378
(stating that the holding of Schnapper “rejected the argument ‘that the introductory
language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on congressional power’”) (quoting
Schnapper, 667 F.2d at 112).
155
Editor’s Note: Although we have not been able to locate the studies referred to by
Mr. Sims, the following examples may be instructive. Modern Library Classics sells
Hawthorne’s Mosses from the Old Manse for $13.95. A free version of this title is
available at http://www.eldritchpress.org/nh/mosses.html. Similarly, Vintage Books has
recently published a paperback edition of The Buffalo Soldier (a work still protected by
copyright) by contemporary author Chris Bohjalian. It too retails for $13.95. See
http://www.randomhouse.com/catalog/display.pperl?0375725466.
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publishing is within a generation of conclusion, are now shifting
their business.156
In the end, there is a bitstream. Either you will be excluded if
you cannot pay, or the rules will have changed and you will choose
whether to take the bitstream in a form which allows you to read at
no cost, or there is a “McDonald’s of text” on the cornercall it
Kinko’swhich manufacturers books for you if books are a thing
you want. Most of us probably will not because the methods of
reading free are superior to the methods of reading on dead trees
and within a generation we shift.
There are forty or fifty novels in my book bag at any time.
They are in my laptop. I read them typeset the way I want them,
on a display whose background texture and color is set the way I
want it at the moment, given the reading conditions. I am not
better off going down to the corner bookstore and buying a copy of
Hawthorne at the existing price, which is largely determined by the
inflexibilities of the distribution system.
I entirely agree with Chuck. There is either a grab for control
on the side of his clients or on the side of my clients. This is
known as class conflict. It results in what is known as the
appropriation of the means of production by one side or the other.
At present, there are five companies that control more than ninety
percent of the world’s popular music.157 They behave like an
oligopoly. They reduce output and raise price. CDs cost $17.00
and most musicians do not live from music.
After the end of their mode of distribution—which is being
undertaken not just by the twelve-year olds, but also by the artists
who see that there is little value for most of them in the existing
distribution system—there will be many more musicians in the
world and music will be more freely available to everyone who
wants it. That is an unalloyed good.

156

See JASON EPSTEIN, BOOK BUSINESS: PUBLISHING PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 177–
92 (2002).
157
Moglen, supra note 39, at 2.
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There are seven companies in the world that control more than
ninety percent of the Western movie market,158 and they also
exclude output and raise price. When they are gone, and both
screen exhibition and, more importantly, personal viewing of video
is no longer subject to their control, more people will make video
art and people will not have to pay for it, so they will be able
voluntarily to support what they love.
This model currently makes the best broadcast electronic news
in the United States at NPR.159 It currently makes the best
software in the world, which is the product of my Free Software
Movement. It currently produces a whole range of cultural
institutions. And, more importantly, before the law of copyright, it
was the model that produced and distributed all of human culture.
It is not a speculative proposition to suggest that the decay of
the propertarian capitalist mode for the production and distribution
of culture would result in more culture, available to more people,
more easily, more freely.
The primary threat to freedom of speech is not the freedom of
speech that is involved in being able to publish Kahlil Gibran,
about which of course I agree with you—it is utterly unimportant.
The primary threat to freedom of speech is the ancillary harm to
the freedom of technical communication being done by your
clients through your extraordinarily skillful means.160
I now have clients who are enjoined all over the world from
explaining how DVDs work, a thing that they have an absolute
right to do under my conception of the First Amendment.161
MR. SIMS: Eben, you know that is not true.
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: No. It is factually accurate. Which
part of it are you challenging?
158

Universal City Studios, Inc.; Paramount Pictures Corporation; Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios, Inc.; Sony Pictures, Inc; Warner Brothers; Disney Enterprises, Inc.; and
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation. See MPAA, at http://www.mpaa.org/about/
index.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2003).
159
See Nat’l Pub. Radio Found., About NPR, at http://zeus.npr.org/about/about.jhtml
(last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
160
See Eben Moglen, Free Software Matters: Exploring the Frontiers of Unfreedom,
NATION, May 10, 2002, at 2.
161
See Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d at 429.
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MR. SIMS: The injunction, as you know, did not cover
explaining anything. It covered the provision of the utility.162
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: You assume that the best way of
explaining how DVDs work is not an executable computer code,
and that is false. It is the case that that injunction covers limericks
written by witnesses in my lawsuit.
MR. SIMS: We are not going to argue about this.
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: All right, fine.
MR. SIMS: Anybody here who thinks that reading Thomas
Wolfe before it was edited by Maxwell Perkins working for a large
publishing company is preferable to reading Thomas Wolfe ought
to do it. Anybody who thinks that the next Saul Bellow who is
now eighteen or twenty years old will find his market, will find his
voice, and will be able to create what he otherwise would have by
self-publishing on the Internet instead of by going to a publisher
which has costs and copyrights and paper, is free to spend all the
time you want looking through the Internet and trying to find
which one of the billion people self-publishing is that one.
But the model that Eben is talking about, which has a lot in
connection with information-wants-to-be-free nonsense we heard
ten years ago, that model is not one I suggest that is going to lead
to the glories of American culture.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Okay. This is an interesting debate.
If there are problems with concentration in a particular
copyright-related market, you have antitrust laws to deal with
oligopolies and concentration as with all other types of markets. It
is not a failing attributable to copyright protection. In fact, if there
are any places in our economy where there is less fear about
oligopoly, it is the copyright-driven industries. Moreover, more
creators now can become their own publishers and producers
because of this great new technology. So there is no reason to
destroy the old, we can have the old and Eben’s new world side by
side. Those who don’t want to exercise copyright rights do not
have to do so. Those who want to, can.

162

Id. at 441.
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So if you are right, Eben, that your vision is the one everyone
will accept, then there should be no fear of copyright. The reason
you fear copyright and want it abolished is that you know deep
down inside that your view is not a view shared by most creators
and distributors—people who want to be remunerated and to make
a living. If your view were right, you would not have to destroy
copyright because people are always free to provide royalty-free
licenses, as some have done in the software industry.
Ultimately I think you are afraid of the marketplace. You have
to control it because you don’t have faith in your vision as being
one that most people will choose.
It is strange that I am a moderator, I must say.
Let’s go to another question. There must be another question
out there.
QUESTIONER: Professor Hansen, I have to say that I am
really disappointed at the unprofessional way you are handling this
panel. I think if you really wanted to take a voice on this panel,
you should have put yourself on the panel and gotten yourself a
moderate moderator. I think you have interfered in the exchange
by being such a person who’s got a point of view that has to be
made. I’m surprised that this happened.
That is all I have to say.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Then you obviously haven’t seen me
before.
QUESTIONER: No. I have seen you before.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: So basically this is it. I am what you
see and this is what you get, and if you don’t like it well it is just
like everything else—you are entitled to your opinion. You do not
like what I am doing. I like what I am doing. And I happen to be
up here and you happen to be down there, and that is just the way it
is. Maybe the next time you will be up here.
QUESTIONER: If I am, I hope I will have a different attitude.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Do you actually have anything
further or is that it?
QUESTIONER: I was going to askyou talked about pushing
away the idea of the term of copyright. Now, I have a client who
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reproduces wonderful old technical books that are in the public
domain. He brings to light to an intellectual audience all over the
world books that have lain fallow for years because it is free to
reproduce. That is the thing that separates him from the ability to
make it. If he had to pay fees, that area of his production would
not take place. So I think we are oversimplifying this whole
business.
Secondly, I am a photographer. I teach artists’ rights. I am a
photographer. I have never seen a more aggressive user of
copyright than the Disney World, who actually tells me you can’t
even photograph their buildings at Disney World and make any use
of it.
So I would be very happy when their copyright runs out so I
would not have that arrogance in front of me.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Another question?
QUESTIONER: I feel like I’m back in college twenty years
ago.
I also want to say to Professor Hansen I wish I were still at
Fordham so I could take one of your classes. I missed that when I
was here.
I was curious as to a response from the other panelists as to Mr.
Carson’s comment that he believes or suspects that the Sonny
Bono Act signified the end of this process whereby the copyright
protection has been expanded. Do the other panelists believe that
we are not going to see within our lifetime, or within a reasonable
period of time, additional extensions proactively or retroactively?
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: Well, if it is true, it is because we
get our work done within the next twenty years and there is no
subject for further discussion. If I do not have them down within
twenty years, of course they will be back. They have no more
intention of giving away Mickey Mouse or Donald Duck or any of
the rest of the franchise in 2024 than they had of giving it away in
2004.
The proposition that Chuck offers about their fear is absolutely
correct.
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One of the things that was happening in October of last year,
after the various events downtown, is that I was spending a fair
amount of time on the Hill trying to keep Disney from succeeding
in getting Senator Hollings’s bill that would have crawled inside
every computer and piece of software on earth and made it protect
copyright their way from being enacted.163
So I would be going in to Hollings’ staff, and out would be
coming Preston Padden, the chief Washington representative of
Disney, former President of ABC News. Preston and his friends
were the only people in all of Washington last October who
weren’t wearing an American flag pin in their lapel. They had
Donald Duck. I can tell you, the feeling of that was really quite
extraordinary. It was “Our empire is our empire. Don’t mess with
us.”
I entirely agree with Chuck, that it is actually fear
masquerading as bravado. They have billions of dollars available
and they have enormous leverage over American politics because
they make image. But they are frightened. They are right to be
frightened.
Far from being unconfident, I know what is going to happen to
them. They will be back in twenty years to buy more legislation, if
we allow bought legislation in the United States in twenty years
and if they exist.
You all, if you do not believe my point of view, might at least
want to have campaign finance reform so that they cannot do it.
And if you believe me, you might want to join up and make sure
that they are not around in twenty years to try again.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I was just told some people didn’t
identify themselves for the record. Did you identify yourself for
the record?
PARTICIPANT: My name is Len Spire. I am a professor at
FIT.

163

See Security Systems Standards and Certification Act at http://cryptome.org/sssca.
htm. See also Eben Moglan, Free Software Matters: More Menace from the Mouse,
NATION, Mar. 19, 2002, at 1.
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PROFESSOR HANSEN: I just wanted that for the purposes of
my lawyer.
The gentleman back there?
PARTICIPANT: Steve Vicker. I am an attorney in New York.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Okay.
I don’t think there ever is going to be a further extension of
term of copyright protection.. I think this was a one-off based on
reaction to the Term Directive in Europe. I do not see it happening
again. It certainly will never happen in Europe; it is not going to
happen in the rest of the world, and it is not going to happen here,
in my view.
Another one? Someone else?
QUESTIONER: My name is Ed Cramer. I am an attorney in
Manhattan.
Without judging the merits or commenting on that, Professor,
is it the logical extension of your position that copyrightnot
extension, but all copyrightshould be abolished?
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: In the long run, the answer to that
question is most certainly yes.
QUESTIONER: Thank you.
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: The proper way of doing it, I think,
is transitionally, through the kind of mixed economy that Professor
Hansen was talking about. It is correct that there ought to be no
reason for the absence of a lengthy period of coexistence between
the free production and distribution worlds and the proprietary
production and distribution worlds. In that Professor Hansen is
correct.
I believe that what prevents that process of coexistence is
precisely the defensive measures of the owners that Chuck was
talking about. I think their concern for desertion is correct. I do
not think it is primarily that they are afraid the audience will
desert. I think it is primarily that they are afraid the creators will
desert, because creators get a very bad deal from the systems of
proprietary distribution. It is possible, I think likely, that at least in
music, and ultimately in video production as well, you see the
producers deserting the media of distribution that currently exists.
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The result, defensively on the part of those industries, is to
attempt to make our modes of behavior illegal. The justification
for doing so is that if we create the free distribution system, it will
be used for piracy, and so it ought to be prohibited from occurring
because it will abet piracy if it exists at all. This is the VCR
argument again, as you remember.164 A technology should be
eliminated because it is seen as contributing to copyright
infringement.
From my point of view, the fact that it contributes to copyright
infringement is either neutral or good but not important. In any
event, it is not a reason for preventing the evolution of the system
of coexistence that Professor Hansen was talking about.
After a generation or so of coexistence between free
development and proprietary development, my forthcoming book
argues, it is safe to do away with the property protection for ideas
altogether.
MR. SIMS: There were amicicreative amici,165 not just copy
amiciwho filed briefs in Eldred, and the symphonic composers,
for example, people like John Corigliano, Libby Larsen, Stephen
Paulusall sorts of symphonic conductors filed a brief supporting
term extension.166 They certainly do not think that their careers
can be made, their families can be fed, and that they can keep
creating, on the basis of a free distribution system.167 I think quite
to the contrary.
One of the interesting points they made is that, unlike popular
music, serious music, academic symphonic music, tends not to find
its audience for many, many yearsmay never find it, but if it
does find it, it is often twenty-thirty years down the pike, so that
for them term extension was particularly important.168

164

See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Publishers et al., Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No. 01-618), http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/
eldredvashcroft/supct/opp-amici/aap.pdf.
166
See Brief of Amici Curiae Symphonic and Concert Composers, Eldred (No. 01-618),
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/opp-amici/composers.pdf.
167
Id. at 17.
168
Id. at 9–13.
165
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Other creatorsDavid Mamet, Richard Avedonfiled briefs
also.169 All of the creative people of that sort filed briefs on the
side of copyright.
The notion of a free distribution system sounds utopian and not
practical.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Okay.
Another question?
We will come back for second turns. Let’s get everyone who
has a first question.
QUESTIONER: My name is Jordan Altman. I am a student
and I am a staff member of the Journal.
I know that we want to create incentives for new works to
come out, but would the panel have a problem if we just gave a
shorter set number of years of protection, like fifty years from the
works’ creation, sort of like we have in the patent system?170 I just
do not see the merit or incentive in counting years from the
author’s death in determining copyright protection.
MS. SELTZER: I would have no problem with a shorter and
fixed term with a return to requirements of registration so that
copyright at least serves the purpose of making known when the
work was created and when it would be available to the public.171
I do not see particular value in assuming that the copyright should
continue after the author’s death when any other kind of productive
worker has to make his or her own provision for heirs.

169
See Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Publishers et al., Eldred (No. 01618).
170
See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
171
Speaker’s Note: I recognize the conflict with the Berne Convention, but a major
rethinking of copyright law should at least start with a clean slate. See Petitioners’ Reply
Brief at 7, Eldred (No. 01-618) (noting that “[t]he beneficiaries of the CTEA need do
nothing to receive its benefit; the gift is automatic”). See also Festo Co. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831, 1837 (2002) (noting that “clarity is
essential to promote progress . . . . A [rights] holder should know what he owns, and the
public should know what he does not”).
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PROFESSOR HANSEN: One distinction is that we have at
least two treaties that would make it difficult.172 As a pure policy
issue, what the term should be is a different matter.
I don’t think there is any particular number that is right or
wrong in this. But there is an analogy to others who through a
lifetime of work pass on existing businesses, for example, to heirs.
Creators who through a lifetime of work need to be able to pass on
the result of their efforts which is contained in intangible property
protected by copyright.
But I agree with Wendy. I do not think that there is any
particular time that is the right time. But we are stuck with life
plus fifty because of Berne. We went to the life plus fifty in the
1976 Act only because of wanting to eventually get into Berne.173
It certainly wasn’t an active policy choice of what should be the
best term of protection.
MR. CARSON: I agree. It is Berne that would really prevent
us from doing that, unless we decided we wanted to opt out of the
international system.174 In this day and age, you’ve heard ample
evidence of how copyright has international implications. You
cannot separate yourself from the rest of the world if you believe in
copyright. You can’t wall off the rest of the world. So we are
pretty much stuck with Berne.
Personallyand I hasten to add that this isn’t the Copyright
Office’s viewI look back wistfully at the terms of the 1909 Act
in a number of respects, including copyright term and some of the
formalities.175 But those days are gone and the only way you will
ever get them backand you will notwill be if you decide you
want to abandon the international obligations we have assumed.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: We are ready for a second question.
QUESTIONER: Ed Cramer.

172

See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S 194; Berne Convention, supra note 16.
173
See Berne Convention, supra note 16.
174
Id.
175
See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2000)).
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I’d like to follow up on that and ask you whether you felt
ultimately that copyright should be abolished. You gave me a
quick answer. The answer was yes.
Now, BMI (Broadcast Music, Inc.) was a client of mine for
about seventeen years. I became its President and Chief Executive
for nineteen years. Neither BMI nor the ASCAP (American
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers) operate for profit,
so that profit motive that you were talking about does not exist for
them.176 Hundreds of thousands of writers depend upon that
income.177
So if you do not have organizations like that, which are
predicated on copyright protection, because you don’t find people
coming up and voluntarily paying for that musicno go, you can’t
get a nightclub or a gin mill or a radiothey are not going to pay
you unless you have copyright protection.
Without that
protectionI am not talking about the termbut without that
protection, which was your ultimate answer, then big trouble for
creative people.
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: Well, we feel differently about that,
not because we feel differently about the role of the intermediaries,
although, as I’m sure you understand, there are lots of musicians
who think that the nonprofit status of ASCAP and BMI has not
prevented their capture by the recording industry. But I am with
you about this.
The intermediaries and the collection societies are important,
regardless of whether what they are distributing are voluntary
contributions or coerced contributions.
I disagree with you that there is any reason to suppose that a
coercive system of music production and distribution in which you
can only have it if you pay for it actually rewards artists better than
a free system of distribution in which people pay what they want
for music. The reason is that the recording industry presently

176

See The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, at
http://ascap.com/1p_about_ascap.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2003); BMI, About BMI, at
http://www.bmi.com/about/backgrounder.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
177
Id.
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keeps ninety-four percent of the dollar.178 We can do a lot better
for artists if we take that ninety-four percent which currently goes
to thugs and rebate a smaller proportion of it to artists overall.
What happens in the twenty-first century is that it becomes
much easier to pay not just musicians but recording engineers and
songwriters and others through the work of collection societies,
such as BMI or its follow-ons. It becomes easier because the
network is the means by which, at the point of delivery of music,
the listener has an opportunity to remunerate easily and
frictionlessly the people that she wants to pay, the consequence of
which is a very much improved situation for the producers.
This is what we show with respect to computer software in the
world of free software. This is what the Future of Music
Coalition179 and the other parties conducting that conversation for
the benefit of the creative community are modeling for them so
they can make their own decisions.
In the end, again I am with Professor Hansen about this. It’s a
matter of choice. Within the next ten years, I believe, and I think
even Carey Sherman180 believes, that you are going to see
recording artists deserting the recording system in droves.
My friend, Chuck D, I think is correct about this.181 In five
years, he says, there will be 5,000 recording companies and a
million recording artists. Nobody makes $10 million a record and
no musician has a day job.182 That is justice. It is worth fighting
for. You should too.
178
See, e.g., Peter Jan Honigsberg, The Evolution and Revolution of Napster, 36
U.S.F. L. REV. 473, 505 (2002), (“Artists receive royalties from the record company
usually ranging from 10% to 20% of the suggested retail list price, less the dubious
deductions for packaging (20% to 25% of the retail price), promotional and other
giveaways, returns, and breakage (10%).”).
179
See Future of Music Coalition, at http://www.futureofmusic.org (last visited Mar.
10, 2003).
180
Carey Sherman is the General Counsel for the Recording Industry Association of
America. See Matt Richtel, New Suit Filed to Bar Trading Music on Net, N.Y. TIMES,
May 25, 2001, at C2.
181
Chuck D is a member of the rap group Public Enemy. See Geoffrey Himes, Chuck
D Hits Close to Home, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1996, at D07.
182
See, eg., Chuck D, ‘Free Music’ Can Free the Artist, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2000,
at A13.
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QUESTIONER: You didn’t answer my question.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I think we have just gotten the word
that the time is up.
Let me say I am happy to agree with Eben on this, since I
think the recording companies have had some horrible practices to
account for, and if this leads to their downfall, I am with you on
that.
PROFESSOR MOGLEN: Thank you.
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Let me say that it has been a
tremendous panel. I apologize if I have offended anyone. Let’s
have a round of applause for our speakers.

